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Like Japan, the countries of Scandinavia went through big macroeconomics crises 
brought on by structural flaws. The difference is that their recoveries came more quickly 
and have been far more robust. Once again, the Scandinavian economies are treated as 
models. We argue that three factors shed light on the difference between Japanese and 
Scandinavian performance:  
1) Policies. We focus mainly on the strategy of "flexicurity" that provides society-wide 
security for workers, in return for which workers grant flexibility to business. Jobs are 
lost but income is sustained and a new job is found. This reduces pressure to sustain 
inefficient firms and industries. 
2) Institutions. Centralized labor-management bargaining enhances equality, creative 
destruction, and responsibility. Both labor and management realize that wage hikes must 
be contained within the level commensurate with productivity growth and international 
competitiveness. Equality of wages across industries enhances market flexibility. Needed 
policy shifts are made easier by the fact that Scandinavia has moved from one-party 
dominance to contested elections. 
3) Attitudes. Attitudes are born of long experience with both policies and institutions, and 
these attitudes, in turn, reinforce those policies and institutions. Trust is the key attitude. 
Workers trust they will get security if they give flexibility. Employers organized into a 
centralized federation treat adult training as a "public good" from which they will 
eventually benefit even if the particular worker that they train leaves after a few years. 
Voters accept harsh budget measures at a time of crisis because they trust it will be done 





Japan is once again going through a sterile debate that pits growth and efficiency against 
equality and security. 
 Many leaders of the both the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) are misreading last July's Upper House elections as a repudiation of 
the reforms of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. They argue that Japan's 
growing income gap, falling real wages, and rising poverty rate are products of market-
oriented reforms. In reality, many of these problems began years before Koizumi came to 
power. Nonetheless, these leaders argue that Japan must shore up equality and security by 
returning to the traditional growth-destroying tools of bridges to nowhere, protection of 
inefficient economic sectors and zombie firms, and the like. In other words, to gain 
equality and security, Japan must return to the practices that led to the "lost decade." 
 On the other hand, there are the Japanese reformers who, in the Koizumi tradition, 
can only see reform in the harsh "magic of the marketplace" version popularized by 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, not so many years ago, Ichiro Ozawa 
praised the Thatcher model, talking as if "small government" were a panacea for Japan's 
myriad problems. To gain growth, Japan’s Thatcherites seem to say, the country must 
surrender to falling real wages and the second highest poverty rate among rich countries. 
 If the debate remains locked into this mode, the public will reject additional 
reform as too harsh. Yet, without reform and better growth, Japan's aging process would 
doom the people to stagnant living standards.  
 Moreover, the fundamental premise of the debate is misguided. Equality and 
growth can be allies, not alternatives. Among 12 rich countries, countries with greater 
income equality enjoyed faster growth in GDP per worker during 1995-2005 (details 
below). In fact, the academic literature is quite divided on how much, if any, trade-off 
there is between growth and equality. 
 Fortunately, there are other models for structural reform, some more suited to 
Japan's communitarian social structure and attitudes. Consider the Nordic countries: 
Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway. In their path to reform, they have followed a 
philosophy that the Danes call “Flexicurity,” a combination of the English words 
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“flexibility” and “security.” 
   In the US, there is lots of market flexibility, but less security for workers than 
elsewhere. The result is good growth for the country as a whole, but stagnant living 
standards for typical workers. A six-month spell of unemployment or a long illness can 
result in the loss of one’s home. Japan and continental Europe suffer from the opposite 
problem: lots of security for a person at his current job, but much less flexibility for the 
economy. In Japan, that means mediocre growth, stagnant real wages and high levels of 
poverty; in continental Europe, it means mediocre growth and high unemployment. 
 The Scandinavians follow a third path, one that combines the growth-enhancing 
flexibility of the market with income security and equality for workers. Rather than trying 
to provide “job security,” i.e., protecting a worker’s ability to stay at a particular job at a 
particular firm for his whole career, they provide “income and employment security,” i.e., 
a society-wide social safety: generous unemployment compensation, active help in 
finding a new job, plus pension and health care plans not tied to any particular job. As a 
result, workers are willing to accept the “creative destruction” that creates economic 
growth. Jobs come and go. Companies come and go. But workers find new jobs, the 
economy’s efficiency rises, and real wages grow for just about everyone. 
 What makes these countries particularly interesting is their parallels with Japan. 
They too enjoyed rapid catch-up to the US in per capita GDP during the 1950s to early 
1970s. Then, they too became fallen stars. They suffered from mounting structural flaws 
that finally culminated in a big macroeconomic calamity. Just as in Japan, in Sweden, 
Finland and Norway, it took the form of banking crises in the early 1990s. Denmark’s 
malaise began with a recession in the early 1980s; the problems got so bad that, in 1982, 
the ruling Social Democratic government threw up its arms in despair and turned the 
government over to the opposition without even an election. After a recovery, stagnation 
set in during the late 1980s when growth was limited to 0.6% from 1987 through 1993. 
Joblessness hit 9.5%. In Sweden, three years of negative growth—a total GDP decline of 
6% during 1991-93--sent the unemployment rate from only 2% in 1988 to 9.4% by 1994. 
Its budget deficit soared to a stunning 13% of GDP. In a futile effort to protect its 
currency, Sweden raised interest rates to a Latin America-like 500%. Some of Sweden's 
problems were precipitated by a Depression in neighboring Finland, one its main 
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markets. Finland's own travails were triggered by the collapse of its main market, the 
Soviet Union. Finnish GDP fell 13% during 1991-93 and unemployment skyrocketed to 
17%. 
 Many analysts wrote an obituary for the Scandinavian "welfare state." Britain's 
Tony Blair and Germany's Gerhard Schroeder didn't even mention Scandinavia when 
they issued their famous "Third Way" paper in 1999. 
 Then, under a series of both Social Democratic and Center-Right governments, 
these countries instituted reforms. They cured macroeconomic instability and steadily 
dealt with growth-hindering structural flaws, but still maintained the traditional emphasis 
on equality and security. Even parties that had once preached neo-liberalism changed, 
realizing they had to keep the fundamentals of the Nordic model. This includes the 
current leaders of the ruling coalitions in Sweden and Denmark, the Moderate party and 
the Liberal party, respectively. They want to adjust the welfare state, not abandon it. 
 Successful reform has put these nations back on top. In the years since 1995, 
Finland and Sweden have achieved the fourth and fifth highest rates of per capita GDP 
growth among a group of 19 rich countries, at 3.5% and 2.7% respectively (the US came 
in 10th at 2.2%). Sweden and Finland came in third and fourth in productivity growth 
(GDP per worker). In the private sector alone, productivity growth slowly accelerated in 
Sweden from 2.5% in 1978-87 to 3.0% in 2002-2006. In Denmark, private sector 
productivity growth more than doubled from a low 1.1% to 2.5%, although there is some 
question as to whether that high rate can be sustained (Figure 1). 
 Meanwhile, flexicurity helped Denmark lower its unemployment rate to 2.9% as 
of October 2007, second only to Norway (2.6%) in the OECD. For some time, Sweden 
had suffered a “jobless recovery,” an issue that helped cause the Social Democrats to lose 
the 2006 election. However, in the year through November 2007, employment rose 2.7%, 
youth employment grew 8%, and Sweden’s unemployment rate is now down to 5.2%. 
 By contrast, productivity growth in the Eurozone is limping along at only 0.8%. 
While European unemployment has improved, it still averages 7% (about the same level 
as the US averaged during 1974-94). It’s above 8% in France and Germany, where 
employment protection laws emphasize keeping a worker in his current job rather than 
the ability to get a new job. 
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 Once again, the Nordic countries are looked upon as models to be emulated.  
Ministers from France and Spain, officials and company chiefs from China, and labor 
unions from Hungary all flock to Stockholm and Copenhagen. They seek advice from 
Danish Employment Minister Claus Hjort Frederiksen and Sweden’s former Swedish 
Finance Minister Par Nuder. They attend seminars run by Owe Pedersen, director of the 
International Center for Business and Politics in Copenhagen or Soren Andersen, a labor-
management professor at the University of Copenhagen.  
 Today, Denmark and Sweden now stand at 3rd and 4th place as the world's most 
competitive economies, according to the famous ranking by the World Economic Forum. 
Finland is 6th and Norway 11th (caveat: the WEF ranking is a very poor predictor of 
growth). Then there is the "Lisbon scorecard," that ranks countries on how well they 
fulfill Europe’s agenda for growth and competitiveness. In 2006, Denmark and Sweden 
came in first and second, while Finland was sixth (Norway did not participate). 
 In surveys on “life satisfaction,” 70% of Danes say there are very satisfied, 
coming in first in a survey of Europe. Sweden came in fourth. There is a good reason for 
this satisfaction. Unlike in Japan, the improvement in the numbers for the macroeconomy 
did not come at the expense of ordinary people. Danish workers simultaneously enjoy the 
highest real wages in Europe, the second lowest unemployment rate in the OECD, and 
the highest income equality in the OECD. Swedes enjoyed one of the highest rates of real 
wage growth over the past decade. Sweden comes in second in equality; Finland and 
Norway are 6th and 7th. 
 
 
Where Have You Gone, Joseph Schumpeter? 
 
Joseph Schumpeter was right. In the long run, the primary source for sustained per capita 
GDP growth is creative destruction. It is creative destruction that promotes long-run 
growth in Total Factor Productivity. 
 It’s stunning how important new firms are to productivity growth. Looking at the 
manufacturing sector of ten industrialized countries (unfortunately not including Japan), 
the OECD broke down overall productivity growth into three sources: increased 
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productivity within existing firms; a shift in output from low-productivity incumbent 
firms to higher-productivity incumbent firms; and firm turnover (i.e., low-productivity 
firms being pushed out of business as new firms with higher productivity replaced 
them).1 
 What they found is this: When it comes to growth in labor productivity, as much 
as two-thirds or even three-quarters comes from the effort of each firm to improve its 
operations by adding new equipment and technology or shedding excess workers. This is 
particularly true of mature industries. Hence it is not surprising that Japan has 
traditionally been so good at labor productivity. 
 However, that route to labor productivity often came at the expense of total factor 
productivity (TFP). Improvements within each firm account for only half of TFP growth. 
The other half is provided by competition among firms. Specifically, nearly 40% of TFP 
growth results from newer firms displacing older firms. Both the exit of inferior firms 
and the entry of newer, superior firms are important. Another 13% of the total TFP 
growth results from efficient firms taking away market share from less efficient firms 
within the same industry. These figures may underestimate the role played by firm 
turnover and competitive pressures, since much of the improvement achieved by 
incumbent firms is done under the duress of competition. Superior firms pressure inferior 
ones to change their ways (Figure 2a) 
 Why is this so? In part it is because new firms more easily bring new technology, 
new attitudes, fresh blood. To the extent that new technologies are embedded in new 
capital, older firms may be reluctant to move too fast, since they have lots of sunk costs 
in the old capital. But the death of old, inefficient firms is equally critical. Moribund 
firms trap capital and labor in low-TFP-growth institutions. In the United Kingdom the 
exit of old moribund firms was at least as important for TFP growth as the entry of new 
firms, and in France the exit of old firms was dominant. 
 The birth and death of firms is the economy’s version of Darwinian 
experimentation and natural selection. Most new firms do not succeed. But those that do 
succeed change the “economic ecology” around them. 
 
                                                 
1 OECD 2001. 
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 But what happens if the destruction is too destructive? What if lives shattered by 
the destruction are unable to find reprieve in the creation due to barriers to entry, rigid 
labor markets and the like? In that case, there will be a lot of resistance to destruction. 
There will be pressure to keep zombie firms alive. Where people depend on their current 
job at their current firm, there is little room for Joseph Schumpeter. The rate of entry and 
exit of firms will be low. 
 Worse yet, a number of studies of Japan in the1990s have shown that the TFP 
level was actually higher at exiting firms than at the surviving firms. It's a kind of 
"reverse Darwinism"—survival of the least fit. Most studies have blamed bank lending to 
zombies. For example, one study cites Kiyohiko Nishimura of the Cabinet Office and his 
colleagues thusly: "Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota (2003) examined entries and exits 
of Japanese firms between 1994 and 1998 using METI data from the Basic Survey of 
Business Structure and Activity, and found the average productivity [levels] for exiting 
firms was often higher than the surviving firms, especially in [sectors with lots of 
nonperforming loans such as] construction, wholesale and retail trade. Since many exit 
decisions are presumably related to availability of working capital, their result indirectly 
suggests a misallocation of funds."2 In this view, the preservation of zombie borrowers 
led to excess capacity and deflation that drove out troubled but salvageable firms, thereby 
lowering TFP levels and economic growth in a kind of "unnatural selection."  
 However, NPLs don't seem to be the entire story. In another paper, Kyoji Fukao 
and his colleague argue that the decline of TFP growth has been even greater in the 
manufacturing industry than in industries, like real estate or retail, typically thought of as 
the host of lots of debt-ridden zombie firms. In manufacturing as well, the TFP levels of 
exiting firms were higher than surviving firms. Among entering firms, the TFP levels of 
was higher but the rate of new entry was so low that the magnitude of positive effects 
was small relative to other countries. Also positive, but small, was the contribution to 
TFP made by superior firms seizing market share. In addition, a great deal of the entry 
and exit came from incumbent firms switching industries rather than new firms being 
born and old ones dying. So, in Japan, most of the TFP growth came from incumbent 
                                                 
2 Cited in Hoshi and Kashyup (2004). It should be noted that, in another paper, Nishimura noted that TFP 
growth rates tended to be lower in exiting firms (Nishimura 2005). 
7 
firms improving their performance. In this regard, say the authors, Japan was an outlier 
compared to other rich countries (Figure 2b).3  
 As with other studies, these authors conclude that a dysfunctional financial system 
is at least one of the causes: "The above result suggests that in order to accelerate TFP 
growth in Japan’s manufacturing sector it is important to promote new entries and to 
make both the exit process and the process of resource allocation more efficient…Using 
regression analysis based on pooled cross-industry data, Fukao and Kwon (2003) found 
that there is a significant negative correlation between the exit effect and that industry’s 
average liability-asset ratio. That is, in industries [i.e. one of 58 sub-industries within the 
manufacturing—rk] where the liability-asset ratio is high, the exit effect tends to be 
negative. There is a possibility that the malfunction of Japan’s financial system 
contributes to the negative exit effect by allowing zombie firms to survive while high-
productive small firms fail as a result of a credit crunch."4 
 What we don't know is whether this pattern of "reversed Darwinism" existed prior 
to the 1990s or whether it persists into the current decade. Undoubtedly, preservation of 
outright zombies has been reduced. What we do know is that barriers to the exit of old 
firms are a barrier to the entry of new ones. Historically, firm turnover in Japan (and 
hence job turnover) has been very low by international standards (Figure 3a). We also 
know that, at least though 2002, it's hard to see a secular improvement in that pattern. 
Exit is a bit higher than at the end of the bubble, though still lower than in pre-bubble 
days. Entry, by at least one measure, was at a record low rate as of 2002. Presumably, the 
post-2002 recovery has improved the rate of entry (Figure 3b). We don't know what it has 
done to the rate of exit.  By contrast, Denmark has one of the highest rates of firm 
turnover in Europe. Sweden one of the lowest rates in Europe, but it's still about twice the 
rate of Japan (Figure 3c).  
                                                 
3 Fukao and Kwon (2005). In the US, it is more likely that a new technology will be introduced via a new 
firm, e.g. Intel and Microsoft displacing IBM. In Japan (and in Sweden but not Denmark), it is more likely 
that an incumbent firm will develop a new division or affiliate devoted to the new technology. We are not 
saying that one model is inherently better than the other. Our concern is the impact of the company-
centered security on protection of inferior firms and labor market rigidity. For a contrary view that the 
American model is the single best route to growth, see Baumol et. al. (2007). 
4 Fukao and Kwon (2005). For this cross-industry regression, Fukao and Kwon (2003) divide the 
manufacturing firm data into 58 sets of different industries and estimated the “exit effect” in each industry. 
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 Then there is the all-important ability of new firms to grow. Here is where the US 
firm-creating machine really stands out. After two years, the average new firm in the US 
has increased employment by 160%, much more so than in Europe. Within Europe, 
Finland has a high rate; Sweden and Denmark have middling rates. Unfortunately, we 
don't have the data for Japan (Figure 3d). 
 There is an additional problem in Japan. While there is lots of competition in 
Japan's efficient export-oriented industries (as measured by change in market ranking, 
market share, and entry of new firms into the ranks of industry leaders), many of Japan's 
domestically-oriented sectors exhibit signs of mutual non-aggression pacts with little 
change in ranking (Figure 4). Michael Porter and his colleagues have shown that the best 
predictor of firm performance in Japan (unfortunately measured only in export 
performance) is not scale, but the fierceness of domestic competition.5 The dearth of 
competition is probably one reason why Fukao and Kwon found so little TFP benefit 
from superior firms taking market share from inferior ones—even in manufacturing. In 
the effort to preserve stability, Japan has sacrificed efficiency. 
 No one would doubt that there has been lots of reform in Japan in the last decade. 
What we do doubt is that is has been widespread enough, or achieved enough critical 
mass, or has had a long enough gestation period to engender a productivity revolution. 
While measured productivity growth has indeed improved, most of this is simply due to 
the effect of the business cycle on the figures. Year-on-year productivity growth goes up 
and down with GDP growth. Looking at the aggregate economy, it's hard to see much of 
acceleration in trend productivity growth (Figure 5a). And, if we break down the 
productivity growth by sector, except for a very encouraging improvement in 
distribution—the subject of major reform--we see most of the improvement in the same 
few sectors that have always worked hard on improving themselves (Figure 5b). Japan is 
getting the most reform where it needs it least and the least reform where it needs it most. 
 While many analysts point to the financial system, we believe the functioning of 
the financial system reflects a deeper underlying part of Japan's political economy. After 
all, why would banks want to lend to the less creditworthy unless there is something else 
going on? That "something else," we believe, is Japan's rigid labor market. It is one key 
                                                 
5 Porter et. al. (2000). 
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reason for the slow pace of creative destruction. In Japan, the real social safety net is 
one's job at the current firm. Big companies practice "internal flexibility, i.e. keeping the 
worker employed but changing hours, cutting wages and/or bonuses, transferring workers 
to affiliated firms, and so forth. Lateral job mobility is hard since firms resist "poaching" 
on each other. Court decisions and prevailing mores have made mass layoffs difficult.6 
Moreover, workers have lots of incentives to stick with the same employer. Seniority 
wages are as strong as ever (Figure 6). The unemployment and pension systems are also 
tied to job tenure (details below). Moreover, to avoid mass layoffs, the government 
subsidizes at least some firms to keep workers on the job during bad times.7 
 While we don't doubt that lifetime employment and internal flexibility provided 
real strengths to Japan in a time of solid growth—both economic and demographic—we 
believe that, in the current era, its costs are greater than its benefits. Some people speak 
of the breakdown in lifetime employment and an increase in "flexibility." However, what 
we believe is going on is a bifurcation of the labor force. Core workers have all of the 
traditional safeguards at their firm, while a growing portion of the labor force—now said 
to number a third—are irregular part-time and temporary workers with much fewer 
protections and benefits, as well as much lower hourly wages. Depending on their 
conditions of work, e.g. how many hours per week, many of these irregular workers lack 
both full access to the internal safety nets regarding health care, unemployment insurance 
and pensions of regular workers, and they also lack sufficient society-wide safety nets 
because the latter are so thin for irregular workers. The unions seem to accept lower 
standards for irregular workers, because they see that as a way of keeping the company 
around as the employer of their core members. Thus, in this regard, the company-based 
unions have more solidarity with their employer than with their fellow workers. 
 Our conclusion is that inferior companies are preserved because that's the way to 
                                                 
6 1979 case law established four conditions to be met before regular employees could be dismissed: 
(1) employers should be faced with compelling and unavoidable necessity for dismissals; (2) they should 
have made every effort to avoid dismissals (e.g. transfers to affiliated companies, terminating employment 
of temporary and part-time workers, facilitating early retirement, reducing overtime and suspending new 
hires); (3) they should consult with trade union representatives and employees about dismissals; and (4) 
they should establish reasonable standards and apply them fairly when selecting workers for dismissal. 
7 Bredgaard and Larsen (2007) write: "Since 1975, the employment adjustment subsidy has played a central 
role in Japan’s employment policy…[w]hen enterprises in designated industries strive to maintain 
employment during a downturn." 
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preserve the social safety net for the core lifetime employees.8 
 
 
Three Models of Capitalism 
 
The literature on "varieties of capitalism" tends to speak of two models of capitalism: the 
liberal market economies characteristic of Anglo-America and the coordinated market 
economies characteristic of Japan and Europe. However, for the purposes of this paper, it 
is more helpful to think of three models: the Japan model (some of whose characteristics 
are shared by continental Europe), the US model and the Swedish model. 
 
Swedish model: Income distribution produced by the market (wages, income of self-
employed, and returns to capital) is unequal. However, government redistribution (taxes 
and transfer payments) do a great deal not only to make income distribution more equal 
but also to provide a society-wide safety net in case of job loss or ill health. 
 
American model (particularly post-Reagan): Income distribution produced by the market 
is unequal and government redistribution only modifies this a little. The labor market is 
very flexible, but there is much less social protection in case of unemployment or a health 
care crisis, or aging. 
 
Japan model (particularly pre-1990 or 1995): Income distribution apparently produced by 
the market is more equal than elsewhere; hence the government does little directly to 
redistribute income. The labor market is less flexible and the society-wide social safety 
net is so thin that workers are much more dependent on their particular job as the main 
safety net. 
 
 We will get into the security issues later. For now, let's focus on equality. 
                                                 
8 Bredgaard and Larsen (2007) write: "At its extreme, the proportion of lifetime workers among male 
university graduates in large firms is 55%... In a study of separation rates during the lost decade, Kato finds 
little evidence for serious erosion of the practice of life-time employment…Rather than dismissing 
workers, large firms…[are] relying on transfers…and … cutting on new recruits." 
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 First, let's look at the distribution of income produced by the market in 1995 (top 
panel of Table 1a). Among the 12 countries in this OECD survey, Japan had, by far, the 
highest share for the poorest 30% and the lowest share for the richest 30%. The US and 
Sweden look surprisingly like each other. 
 Now, let's look at the final disposable income after including taxes and transfer 
payments (middle panel of Table 1). Sweden, along with Denmark, had the highest share 
of disposable income going to the poor and lowest share to the richest 30%. Japan was 
very close to the 12 country average. The US had the lowest share going to the poor and 
tied with Italy for the most going to the rich. 
 Finally, let's look at the impact of government in redistributing income (bottom 
panel). Denmark and Sweden, along with Belgium, did the most to shift income from rich 
to poor. Japan, by far, did the least. The US was second to Japan in doing so little. In 
most countries, by far the lion's share of redistribution is to the poor. However, in Japan 
and the US, a far larger share of the (small) redistribution goes to the middle class. 
 Table 1b covers just the working age population for the year 2000 and gives 
somewhat different results. Japan appears less egalitarian in these results, with the post-
government share of the poorest 30% less than the OECD average. Also, note that, 
among working age people, Sweden, Denmark and Finland do a lot of redistribution to 
the middle class as well as the poor. The US redistributes more to the middle class than 
the poor and almost all of Japan's redistribution is to the middle class. (Table 1b is from a 
different series and may not be strictly commensurate with Table 1a) 
 Interestingly enough, during the mid-1980s, Norway and Denmark looked more 
like Japan if we use a different measure of income equality: the Gini coefficient for 
working age households (Table 2). Among 15 OECD countries, Norway and Denmark 
topped the ranks with the most equal market-determined distribution of income. Japan 
came in fourth. As a result, like Japan, Denmark and Norway saw little need to do that 
much via taxes and government transfer payments. Denmark ranked 13th and Norway 
ranked 11th in government measures to equalize income. Japan was 15th. Nonetheless, 
because market-determined income distribution had started off so equally, Denmark 
came in 2nd and Norway 3rd in the final post-government distribution of disposable 
income. Japan didn’t do so well: only 9th. The US, by the way, came in 10th in the pre-
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governmental Gini, dead last among the 15 in the impact of governmental measures, and 
dead last in post-governmental equality. 
 However, by the year 2000, Denmark (but not Norway) had shifted to a somewhat 
greater role for government. It came in second in pre-governmental equality, first in post-
governmental equality, and third in the impact of governmental measures. In 2000, Japan 
was third in pre-governmental equality, 10th in post-governmental equality and last in the 
impact of governmental measures. 
 One of the reasons for the greater equality in Scandinavia is that they ensure 
equality, not just across income classes, but during the life cycle. A generous society-
wide social safety net ensures that a spell of joblessness or a health care crisis does not 
cause someone to lose their home or enter poverty. Social insurance buffers equality. 
 Although there has been a trend toward greater inequality throughout the OECD 
in the last couple decades, a trend to which Scandinavia has not been immune, the 
Scandinavians have not given up very much equality in their drive toward greater 
efficiency (Figure 7). 
 Japan's people have been accustomed to an economy in which equality appears to 
have been produced by the market. Now, due to a combination of economic malaise, 
market-oriented reforms, and the corporate world’s turn toward irregular workers, that 
market-income equality is eroding. Japan is, in effect, moving from the classic Japan 
model closer to the US model. What would serve it better, in our view, is to move toward 
something closer to the Swedish model.  
 Almost all OECD countries have moved to a less egalitarian distribution of 
market-based income among working age people. In fact, the more egalitarian the 
distribution was the mid-1980s, the greater the shift toward less equality. The 
Scandinavians were hardly immune to this shift. Japan's shift was somewhat less than the 
normal as indicated by the trend line (Figure 8a). On the other hand, the countries 
experiencing the greatest shift toward market inequality did the most to make up for this 
shift via government remedies. Sweden and Denmark did somewhat more than the 
typical country, while Japan did somewhat less (Figure 8b). The overall result is that, in 
general, the countries with the most egalitarian distribution in disposable income in the 
mid-1980s also had the most egalitarian distribution in 2000 (Figure 8c). 
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 What is overlooked by Japan's Thatcherite reformers and “the resistance forces” 
alike is that market-produced income equality can be done either in ways that aid growth 
or hinder it. It's one thing to produce equality via the shunto and equality of educational 
opportunities. It's quite another to produce it via bridges to nowhere, price supports for 
farmers, and saving zombie firms. Japan’s company-centered path to security and 
equality not only helped lead to the “lost decade," but has also slowed the structural 
reforms needed to fully recover from it. By contrast, Scandinavia’s society-centered path 
to security and equality has led to rapid recovery from their crisis. 
 
 
Equality and Growth 
 
“A bumble bee that flies.” That’s how former Swedish Social Democratic Finance 
Minister Par Nuder describes the success of the Scandinavian model.9 By the laws of 
physics as now understood, the bumblebee should not be able to fly. Yet, it does. 
Similarly, many neoliberal economists and politicians say that economies marked by high 
tax rates, “overly” generous unemployment insurance systems, and “excessive” income 
equality should not fly either. Yet, fly they do. 
 Some economists claim equality comes at the expense of growth. Equality and 
Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff, a very influential 1975 book by Arthur Okun, formerly a 
top economic adviser to Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, set the tone for 
this type of thinking. Today, however, the academic journals are filled with papers 
arguing both sides of the question. One of the most interesting explorations of the issue is 
Jonas Pontusson's 2005 book, Inequality and Prosperity, which also adopts the three-
model approach and finds no trade-off between equality and growth. 
 We don't want to attempt a full exploration of the issue. But a cursory look at the 
data does not show any obvious link between equality and growth in either direction. 
What we suspect is that the real issue is not equality versus inequality, but how that 
equality is produced. Is it done in growth-harmonious ways or growing hindering ways? 
 In the top panel of Figure 9, countries with greater income equality enjoyed 
                                                 
9 Interview with author, December 2007 
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somewhat higher per capita growth during the last decade. However, the R-squared is 
tiny. Thus, all we can say is that, from this small sample during these years, there is no 
evidence of a growth-equality trade-off. In the bottom panel, we look at the size of 
governmental redistribution measures. Again, countries that did more redistribution 
enjoyed better growth but the result does not pass muster on statistical significance. 
 What this suggests is that countries have a political choice on equality. They do 
not necessarily have to give up equality to gain efficiency. Or, at least, the trade-offs may 
be a lot smaller than under the choices now being presented to the Japanese voter. 
 
 
Culture vs. History 
 
Japan has more in common with the Nordic countries than the fact that Norway also 
hunts whales while safeguarding farmers. Like Japan, the Nordic countries were horribly 
poor a century ago, when a famous writer called Sweden “a fortified poorhouse.” And, 
like Japan, Nordic countries now seen as epitomizing social harmony, were once homes 
to terrible internal violence, from labor-management clashes in Sweden and Denmark to 
outright civil war in Finland. 
 The modern Scandinavian welfare state springs not from ancient culture but from 
recent history. There were some early attempts at compromise, including an 1899 labor-
employer pact in Denmark, those failed to prevent outbreaks of violence and big strikes). 
The great turning point came in 1929-1932 when Social Democrats successively took 
power in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Epitomized by the famous Saltsjobaden 
Agreement of 1938 between Swedish trade union federation (LO) and employers' 
federation (SAF), the grand historical labor-business compromise laid the foundations for 
growth, social harmony and consensus decision-making, and modern welfare state.10 
 It also laid the basis for decades of virtually uninterrupted dominance by the 
Social Democrats (by themselves in Sweden and as the leader of coalition governments 
in Denmark). As in Japan, single-party dominance eventually led to excesses, rigidity, 
and economic malaise. In 1976 in Sweden and 1982 in Denmark, the Social Democrats 
                                                 
10 For a general review, see Einhorn and Logue. 
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fell from power. Since then, parties have alternated in power. The experience of both 
victory and defeat has led the Social Democrats to moderate their vision and the Liberals 
in Denmark and the Moderates in Sweden (who now lead multi-party center-right 
coalition governments) to abandon neo-liberalism. 
 We believe the transition from one-party democracy to genuine party competition 
has a lot to do with the ability of these societies to make the adjustments necessary for 
successful reform. 
 
Flexicurity and The Three-Legged Stool 
 
What makes the system work is what people sometimes call a “golden triangle,” but what 
could also be described as a three-legged stool that topples unless all three legs are 
strong. The three legs are: 
 
1) macroeconomic stability;  
2) a flexible, globalized market-oriented business/labor system that promotes growth; 
and 
3) income equality and security. 
 
 Keeping inflation low means workers don’t need to seek excessive nominal wage 
hikes that price exports—about half of GDP—out of the market. Stable inflation and 
budget balances avoid stop-go macroeconomic policies. Conversely, an active labor 
market policy that quickly retrains and reemploys laid-off workers keeps structural 
unemployment low. In a December 2007 interview with the author, Danish finance 
ministry officials said that they estimate that Denmark has lowered NAIRU from 9% to 
4.5% over the past ten years. Hence, there is no political demand for the excessive 
monetary or fiscal stimulus that results in inflation. Conversely, there is no demand for 
the disinflationary monetary policies that kept US unemployment at a 7% average from 
1977 through 1994.11 Administratively expensive microeconomic measures were used to 
                                                 
11 And might have kept unemployment at a high level even longer had Alan Greenspan not taken a chance 
on growth. 
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achieve results attained via administratively cheaper but socially more costly 
macroeconomic instruments elsewhere. Meanwhile, good growth, efficiency and some of 
the highest employment rates among rich countries all provide the means to finance the 
welfare state’s famous social benefits—from generous unemployment compensation, to 
free child care, elderly care, health care and education. In turn, those expensive social 
benefits—paid for by taxes and spending that take up almost half of GDP-- make workers 
unafraid of the “creative destruction” that promotes growth and efficiency. 
 It is the latter point which is most important for the cause of reform in Japan—and 
for the US as well. The social security benefits that some neoliberal economists claim 
will destroy efficiency and growth can do the opposite—as long they are done correctly. 
 Unlike Japan or much of continental Europe, Scandinavian welfare states do not 
attempt to protect a worker’s particular job in a particular firm. It is cheaper and easier to 
layoff redundant workers or even close down a plant in Scandinavia than in Germany or 
France. Workers lose jobs as companies downsize and, especially in Denmark, can be 
fired because of incompetence. 30% of Danes change jobs every year, the highest in the 
OECD. What is protected is a worker’s income while he or she is unemployed, through 
generous unemployment insurance that replaces up to 75-90% of a low-income worker’s 
wage, and “active labor market programs” that help workers to get a new job quickly. 
The Scandinavians talk, not of job security, but of employment security.12 
 Every year, 11% of Danes lose their jobs and another 20% quit to find better jobs. 
So, altogether nearly a third of all Danes switch jobs every year, the highest turnover rate 
in the OECD (Figure 10). Job tenure is much higher in Sweden, partly due to "first in, 
last out" layoff policies. Nonetheless, flexibility is still high in Sweden. 
 For those who are laid off, Denmark provides the most generous unemployment 
insurance in the OECD (Figure 11 and Table 3). A Swedish or Danish worker earning 
75% of the income of an average production worker gets enough unemployment 
compensation to replace about 75-80% of his lost income—compared to only 26% in 
                                                 
12 Political objectives may lie behind the difference between job security and employment security. In 
Scandinavia, it was the labor movement that chose the objective of society-wide employment security in 
the interests of equality and social insurance. Pontusson (2005) notes that, in continental Europe, it was the 
conservatives who proposed job security tie to the firm as a method of social stability. This paternalism not 
only competed against the socialists, but also gave the worker a greater shared interest with his employer 
than with fellow workers at a competing firm or in another industry. For Japan, see Gordon (1998). 
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Britain, and 60% in Germany. The average worker in Scandinavia gets about 60% versus 
a third in the US. Moreover, 20% of Americans job-losers find they are ineligible for 
unemployment benefits.13 
 By contrast, the Japanese system is calculated to provide incentives for both firms 
and employees to practice long tenure at the same firm. 
 According to one study, despite higher statutory rates for unemployment, the 
actual effective replacement rate for a typical unemployed worker in Japan is a 
shockingly low 10%, compared to an OECD-wide average of 30% (Figure 12). One 
reason would seem to be that benefits run out for the long-term unemployed for reasons 
to be discussed immediately below. Secondly, "the Japanese unemployment insurance 
system has extremely strict conditions for eligibility, which is indicated by the fact that 
the ratio of benefit receipt to total unemployed was only around one-third at the end of 
the 1990s."14 
 It is not just low replacement rates that compel workers in Japan to rely on job 
security at their current firm rather than employment security within the economy as 
whole. It is the fact that, like seniority wages, the unemployment system is structured to 
reward those who stay longer on their job. A worker under age 44 whose has done 
insured work for as long as five years can only get unemployment benefits for 90 days, 
whereas a 45-59 year-old who has done insured work for 20 years is eligible for 300 days 
worth of benefits (Table 4). While insured work does not necessarily mean working at the 
same firm, this provision, in combination with the dearth of lateral occupational mobility, 
means that short-tenured workers who lose a job are in big danger of seeing their benefits 
run out. That's because long-term unemployment is fairly high in Japan: Around 50% of 
Japanese unemployed experience unemployment for more than 6 months, and around 
33% for more than 12 months. The corresponding figures for Denmark were also high at 
44% and 26% respectively, which put a lot of financial pressure on Denmark to lower 
overall unemployment.15 
 Japan's system also punishes the growing ranks of part-time and temporary 
workers since eligibility is limited to those who have worked more than 20 hours a week 
                                                 
13 Ilsoe (2007). 
14 Bredgaard and Larsen (2007). 
15 Bredgaard and Larsen (2007). 
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and have done insured work for six of the previous twelve months. 
 Japan's pension system also penalizes workers who leave, or get dismissed from, 
their firm. Japanese enterprises finance the retirement pension system of their workers in 
proportion to the number of years of service at a specific company and depending on the 
reason for retirement, i.e. voluntary versus mandatory or company requested retirement. 
 No wonder that in Japan, as in continental Europe, nearly half of all workers have 
worked at the same firm for more than 10 years (Table 5). The comparable figures are 
26% in the US and 31% in Denmark. 
 To motivate long-term unemployed to look harder for jobs, both Denmark and 
Sweden have somewhat tightened their benefits. In 1994, Denmark significantly shifted 
from just passive unemployment benefits to a more active labor market policy. As part of 
the shift, the trade unions accepted a decrease in the period of eligibility for 
unemployment benefits, as well as a worker's right to regain eligibility simply by 
participating in activation measures rather than holding an actual job. Denmark has cut 
the duration of unemployment compensation to a still very generous four years and may 
cut it further. For a low-income worker in Sweden, the amount of income replaced now 
declines from an initial 80% to 70% after 40 weeks, and then 65% after 60 weeks. 
According to one study, the typical replacement level in Denmark has fallen back from 
65% in the mid-1990s to 50% these days (see again Figure 11). 
 Meanwhile, in both Sweden and Denmark, center-right coalitions are cutting 
taxes for low-income workers, through earned income tax credits as well as cuts in tax 
rates. The purpose is to widen the gap between the unemployment benefit and after-tax 
income, so as to give low-skill workers more incentive to find work. Denmark also 
provides employers with temporary subsidies to hire long unemployed, low-skill workers. 
Strict rules prevent these subsidized workers from undercutting regular workers. 
 What really makes Denmark and Sweden stand out are their "active labor market 
programs." They each spend 1.5% of GDP a year on these programs, more than any other 
rich country besides Holland, which was the first country to introduce a "flexicurity" 
system (Figure 13). At any given time, about 30-40% of Danish unemployed are in 
programs ranging from subsidized training programs at the technical schools or 
companies, to subsidies for "Flexjobs," to re-training programs for workers who can no 
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longer find new jobs in their old occupation, to temporary subsidies for firms to hire long 
unemployed low-skill workers. Once again, strict rules prevent these subsidized workers 
from undercutting regular workers. 
 Jette Sindholt is one of the faces of Flexicurity in Denmark. After working 12 
years running a cigarette-making machine at the House of Prince (HOP), Jette fell 
severely ill three years ago. She had to stay home for three full months. Worse yet, she 
never fully recovered. Elsewhere, this might have spelled disaster. But not in Denmark. 
The government not only paid for her health care but it also gave her a sick leave 
payment during her illness. Then, HOP took her back in a "Flexjob." Unable to work 
either full-time or to operate the machinery, she instead, she works five hours a day in 
quality control. HOP still pays her the full salary of a machine operator, and half of that 
money comes from the government. This outcome makes everyone happy. "I'd much 
rather be working than sitting at home," says Jette. The taxpayers are better off because, 
if Jette had not returned to work, she'd be entitled to a government-paid disability 
pension. While less than what she now earns, it would be more the Flexjob subsidy the 
government now provides. Finally, HOP has retained a loyal, conscientious worker. 
Although Jette needs extra rest breaks, the government subsidy makes it worthwhile to 
HOP. Not all workers in Jette's situation are quite as fortunate as she is. "HOP is an 
exceptional company. Some other company might have let me go." But most workers in 
Jette's situation are a lot better off than in other rich countries.16 
 Other faces of Danish Flexicurity include the already-employed machinery 
operators that HOP sends to a two-year technical training school to upgrade their skills. 
The government pays for the school while HOP pays the workers' salary. In return, HOP 
gets workers who have learned how to fix the machinery and even improve it.  
 At any given time, 30% of Danish and Swedish adults are in some sort of 
government-financed adult education and training program, the highest ratios in the 
OECD (Figure 14). Flexicurity is a kind of kaizen for both people and the production 
process. 
 Then there are the workers from government-financed technical schools that HOP 
accepts for three months of on-the-job training. Some of these are job-losers who need 
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training for a new occupation. Some of them are people who just wanted to better 
themselves. HOP won't get a permanent benefit since it has few new openings to hire 
these trainees. Why then does HOP do it? "It's our social responsibility," says production 
manager Christian Johansen.17 Taking on these trainees does impose some cost to HOP; 
so here, too, the government provides a subsidy. 
 Some low-skill workers, particularly those out of work for some time, are less 
motivated than the majority of jobless. Most of the workers who come to firms directly 
out of these training programs are taken up a minimum wages by firms like big cleaning 
services. Sometimes, the people who answer the ads are graduates of the government's 
training programs. However, says production chief Johansen, when a worker waits until 
he is sent by the program itself, he is often less interested in the job than in being able to 
show that he has gone on the interview so he can keep his unemployment benefits. 
  Combining active labor measures and unemployment compensation, Denmark 
spent 4.2% of GDP and Sweden 2.5% in 2005, numbers that have come down as 
unemployment has been rolled back (see again Figure 12). 
 Most of this money is well spent. Not only did Denmark reduce unemployment 
from nearly 10% in 1993 to less than 3% today, but only 0.8% of workers have been out 
of work for more than 12 months. In Sweden it's 1%. 
 Not surprisingly, when people were asked if they felt anxious about losing their 
current job, Danes, Swedes and Finns were among the least fearful in Europe (Figure 15). 
In fact, 80% of Swedes and 75% of Danes say they benefit from switching jobs, 
compared to only 40% in the rest of the EU.  
 Whatever their other differences, there is clear agreement between labor and the 
Social Democrats on the one hand and business and the center and right parties on the 
other hand on the basic nature of the social contract: "flexicurity," i.e. market flexibility 
in return for employment and income security. The fights are not over whether to do this, 
but how. One area of disagreement is how to employ the more marginal workers among 
those with low levels of education, immigrants, and forth. 
 However, when it comes to the basic "flexicurity" social contract, labor and 
business agree. A joint document by the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and 
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the Confederation of Employers (DA) describes the labor-management bargain this way: 
“It is almost costless for workers to change jobs as they do not loose any rights like paid 
holidays, pensions etc. and for companies it is relatively easy to dismiss an employee.”18 
 When asked about Japan's or continental Europe's attempt to protect particular 
jobs at particular companies, Nuder, the Social Democrat responded, "Our tradition is 
that we protect people, but not jobs. Being a small country, depending on exports, we 
can't even think of trying to protect our industry. We have to be very competitive. This 
means that we have to be very pro-change." The secret, he says, is that, "We have created 
social bridges for people to walk on from old conditions that are no longer competitive 
jobs to new conditions. If you want to have a strong capitalism, you have to have a strong 
social safety net."19 
 His words are almost the same as those spoken by his political opponent, current 
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a man who used to be a neoliberal. Back 
in 2004 at a congress of his Liberal party, Rasmussen declared, “By international 
standards, we have a very flexible labor market…It is easy for Danish employers to hire 
and fire employees.” But, then he added, “This is, however, only possible because we 
have a high level of social security.”20 And that social security, in turn, is only possible 
because of high level of taxes and spending. 
 Swedish State Secretary of Finance Hans Lindblad, one of three politically-
appointed State Secretaries serving directly under the Finance Minister, explained it this 
way: "Just as you buy insurance to spread risk, here we spread the risk to everyone 
through a publicly-funded social welfare system. In Japan it is kept within the company, 
which we think is more risky."21 
 By contrast, in Japan and continental Europe, well-meaning laws and practices 
protecting workers in their current jobs often hurt the very people they aim to help. Firms 
that are restricted from getting rid of excess workers in tough times are extra careful 
about hiring them even in good times. In Japan, that leads to protecting zombie firms and 
to firms switching to low-wage irregular workers, who now comprise a third of the labor 
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force. In continental Europe, that leads to high long-term unemployment and high youth 
unemployment. The long-term (over 12 month) unemployment rate is 4% in France and 
5% in Germany. 
 What it also leads to in Japan is overworked. Rather than hire a new employee—
which implies an increase in fixed costs and commitments—firms would rather have the 
existing employees work longer hours. The proportion of Japanese workers working 
more than 50 hours a week in year 2002 was 28% compared to 20% in the United States, 
15% in the United Kingdom, 5% in Denmark, and 1.4% in the Netherlands. The 
proportion of Japanese workers working more than 60 hours per week was 12% in 2004. 
Despite this—or because of this--the premium pay for overtime work was low in Japan 
compared to other countries.22 
 The US suffers the opposite problem from Japan and continental Europe. Labor 
markets are very flexible but at the cost of real wages. American workers losing their jobs 
due to imports face an average 20% pay cut at their new job (Figure 16). No wonder that 
there is a growing backlash against globalization in the US among both Democratic and 
Republican voters. By contrast, when a worker in Denmark or Sweden loses his job, be it 
from imports, technology or some other cause, he is much more likely to get a new job at 
an equivalent wage—and perhaps higher if his skills have been upgraded. 
 Workers unafraid to lose their jobs make no political demands to keep “zombie” 
firms or industries alive. Nor do workers need fear that globalization will take their 
livelihoods away. On the contrary, in Sweden, 80% tell pollsters that increased trade is a 
good thing for their country. In Denmark, Minister for Employment Claus Hjort 
Frederiksen says that 70% of Danes regard globalization as "a unique economic 
opportunity." In the rest of Europe, he says, the figure is only 40%.23 
 Lena Westerlund, senior international economist at The Swedish Trade Union 
Confederation, declared, "We are pro-free trade. Sweden would not have been at this 
level of per capita income we didn't have an open economy. But we want to have security 
for the workers." Whether globalization is positive or negative for workers, Westerlund 
cautioned, depends on the strength of institutions that support security and equality. 
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Given the lack of security in the US, she says it is rational for American workers to fear 
globalization.24 
 The result of the Scandinavian grand bargain on flexicurity is a system that allows 
firms and workers to easily shift from sunset companies and industries into sunrise ones. 
That, as we shall see, sparked a renewed spurt of growth and productivity after the 
reforms of the 1990s. 
 Some critics of the system, including many voters, say that, in Sweden at least, 
the system has failed to create enough new jobs, particularly in the private sector. It's one 
of the reasons that the Swedish Social Democrats lost the election in 2006 after spending 
12 years presiding over the recovery. Booming GDP growth failed to translate into new 
private sector jobs.  
 The truth is a bit more complicated. For one thing, in 2005, Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden had the second, third and fifth highest employment rates among 22 countries 
in the OECD (Figure 17). Secondly, over the past 20 years, the best predictor of job 
growth has been demographics: growth in the working age population (Figure 18a). 
Finally, there has been somewhat of a regression to the mean on employment rates. 
Countries with the highest employment rates, like Sweden and Denmark, did the worst at 
creating new jobs, while countries with low employment rates like Holland and Ireland 
did much better (Figure 18b). 
 Nonetheless, the failure of the system to create enough new private sector jobs is 
a big political issue, and one that divides the parties. But debates about solutions take 
place within the context of the flexicurity philosophy, not as part of an effort to 
overthrow it. And this year may be the beginning of progress on that front. In the year 
through November 2007, jobs grew by 2.7% from November 2006. Employment growth 
among young people -- the 15-24 year olds -- was particularly marked, increasing 8.4% 
 Scandinavia also holds important lessons for those who call globalization a “race 
to the bottom” that drives down wages. During the past decade, Sweden topped the charts 
in real wage growth, while still having one of the highest trade:GDP ratios in the OECD. 
Norway came in second in wage growth (Figure 19). 
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Wage Equality Can Promote Productivity 
 
One of the most famous aspects of Scandinavia’s “bumblebee economics” is a wage 
system promoting the highest income equality in the OECD. Some economists claim this 
equality must come at the expense of growth. The reality on the ground seems to show 
that, when done correctly, equality-promoting measures can also be growth-promoting.  
 As part of an historical compromise beginning in Sweden in the late 1930s, the 
Scandinavian countries adopted a policy of ensuring more or less equal pay for equal 
work. In many countries, janitors working for computer companies get higher wages than 
janitors working for apparel manufacturers. So do accountants and assembly line 
workers. In Scandinavia, he big trade union federations and the employers associations 
got together and set the pace for a fairly uniform rate of wage increase. From the 1960s 
through the 1980s, wage inequality among Swedish blue-collar workers decreased by a 
stunning 75%.25 Although the mechanisms and levels of formal centralization have 
changed over time, the principle of fairly equal wages remains at the core of the 
Scandinavian model.  
 The cross-country data seems to show: the more centralized the bargaining, the 
greater the wage equality (Figure 20). In Japan, as the shunto weakened, the wage 
premium of workers in the 6,000 biggest firms increased. In the mid-1970s, workers in 
big firms earned 53% more than their small firm counterparts; today it's over 90% 
(Figure 21). 
 Back in the 1940s, two economists from Swedish Trade Union Confederation, 
Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, argued that wage equality for people in the same 
occupation would help promote productivity growth. Low wages, they argued, were a 
subsidy to inefficient firms and industries. Conversely, making wages more equal would 
help efficient firms and industries make higher profits, which they could use to expand 
and thus become a larger share of the economy. Inefficient industries and firms would 
either have to improve or downsize, perhaps even close down. Gradually, in a kind of 
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Darwinian selection process, capital and labor and output would seamlessly shift toward 
more efficient industries and firms.  
 The system worked. According to a 2000 study by economists Douglas Hibbs and 
Hakan Locking, “Equalization of relative wages between plants and industries evidently 
raised aggregate output and productivity significantly, most likely…by expediting the 
flow of labor and capital resources from less to more efficient activities.”26 Efficiency 
plus equality means higher real wages for everyone. 
 But then the Social Democrats and unions went too far. They didn’t just want 
janitors and machine tool workers to earn the same regardless of industry; they wanted to 
erase too much of the pay difference between janitors and machine tool workers and 
doctors. From “equal pay for equal work,” they, in effect, shifted to “equal pay for all 
work... This, argued Hibbs and Locking, hurt productivity and economic growth, partly 
because it eroded incentives for people to better themselves. 
 The problems caused by this shift ended up leading both the Swedish Employers 
Federation (SAF) and the union of workers in the machinery industry, Metall, to break 
with the central bargaining system in various ways during the 1980s to early 1990s. In 
1990-91, in the midst of the economic crisis, SAF formally broke with the whole model 
of centralized bargaining. In fact, under the slogan, "farewell to corporatism," for a while 
the SAF tried to take the neoliberal approach of ending the Swedish welfare state.  
 However, the 1990 break was more complicated than a simple issue of capital 
versus labor, or neoliberal thinking among the employers. Torben Iversen, in fact, argues 
the opposite: that it was caused by a "cross-class coalition" of labor and capital in the 
engineering industries exposed to international competition versus the sheltered public 
sector workers. Skilled workers in the engineering sectors wanted higher wages—and 
employers were willing to pay higher wages to attract better workers. But neither the IG 
Metall union nor the employers in those industries wanted higher wages in the export 
sector to lead to commensurate higher wages among public workers, which would mean 
higher taxes. A similar process occurred in Denmark.27 
 In the end, both Sweden and Denmark ended up reconstituting coordinated wage 




bargaining system in a more complex form. One reason that, in Sweden as elsewhere, 
centralized bargaining in a small country leads both labor and management to think more 
in terms of the impact of their actions on the country as a whole. Workers, particularly 
those in export sectors, are more likely to moderate their nominal demands under 
centralized bargaining than under decentralized. Lena Westerlund of the Swedish union 
federations argues that this has ended up benefiting the workers themselves: while they 
bargained for nominal wage hikes in the inflationary 1980s, which fueled both inflation 
and currency depreciation, they did much better in real terms once inflation was tamed.28 
 
 
Anti-Poverty and Social Mobility 
 
Social mobility, the ability of poor but talented children to rise, is a prime ingredient of 
growth. It’s one reason that America has always thought of itself as the land of 
opportunity. It’s one reason that, after World War II, the US government spent lots of 
money helping poor and middle class students go to college. Today, in the post-Reagan 
era, that ethic no longer prevails. Social mobility is a lot lower in the US than in 
Scandinavia. 
 In the US, analysts often speak of a cycle of poverty: single mothers bearing 
children who grow up in poverty, ill health, lack of education, crime-ridden 
neighborhoods. All this leads the children of the poor to have a tougher time doing well 
in school and escaping poverty. 
 Scandinavia spends a lot of money to reduce poverty, defined as disposable 
income less than one-half of the median household disposable income (median is where 
half of households have more and half have less). Just 5% of Swedes and Danes live in 
poverty, the second and third lowest among a group of 17 OECD countries. By contrast, 
Japan at 13.5% and the US at 13.7% have the highest poverty rates in the OECD. 
Interestingly, all four of these countries start off with similar rates of poverty, as 
determined in the market. The difference is that the Danes and Swedes lift most of the 
poor out of poverty; the Japanese and Americans leave most of them there (Figure 22).  
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 This has big consequences for both social mobility and income equality. In the 
US, 42% of children born into the lowest fifth of income levels will remain in the lowest 
fifth as adults. In Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway, the figure is only 24-28%. 
One reason is that the educational performance gap—how well children of the poor do in 
math, for example, compared to children of the rich and educated--is lower in the Nordic 
countries, especially Finland, Norway and Sweden, than in the US. Fortunately, for 
Japan, its performance gap is one of the smallest in the OECD. This is important because 
educational equality leads to income equality as well as social mobility (Figure 23a, 23b). 
 
 
Crisis of the System 
 
In Sweden, a stunning number of people, including young people, are out of work due to 
health issues and permanent disability, despite the fact that Sweden is quite a healthy 
country. In 1992, a Health Minister changed the rules so that workers could not get paid 
for their first day out of work. Absenteeism plunged, prompting some wits to suggest 
nominating the minister for the Nobel Prize in medicine. 
 Unfortunately, this problem is typical of the excesses and imbalances that built up 
during the long period of virtually uninterrupted Social Democratic rule. No matter how 
good any country’s economic model is, notes Ove Pedersen, Director the International 
Center for Business and Politics in Copenhagen, the model must shift as conditions 
change. Single-party dominant states have a tough time adapting.29 
 Just as in Japan, some of Scandinavian countries developed a dual economy, 
combining a highly productivity sector with an inefficient sector. In Scandinavia, the big 
problem was the rapid rise of public sector employment. 
 In part, this was an unavoidable response to demographic and social changes. 
More women wanted to work and, to do so, they required care for their children and 
aging parents. So, the Nordic countries spent a lot of money on providing child and 
elderly care and hiring mostly women to work in these centers. There were many positive 
results from these policies. One was that they helped fight (and partially reverse) a 
                                                 
29 December 2007 interview with author. 
28 
decline in fertility rates. 
 The problem was not the welfare state per se, but the fact that these benefits were 
not produced in the most cost-efficient way. Instead of having many private firms 
providing the services and thus promoting competition efficiency, many people who 
would be private employees elsewhere were very often public employees in Sweden and 
Denmark, such as doctors or people doing child care and elderly care. In Norway and 
Holland, by contrast, even though the government pays for childcare, elderly care and 
health care services, they are often provided by private companies. 
 As a result, public employment soared in Denmark and Sweden. Back in 1960, 
only 12.8% of Swedish workers were public employees, a bit less than in the US and 
around the same as in the OECD as a whole. But by 1994, public employment had risen 
to 30%, almost twice the OECD average. It has since stayed around that level. The same 
trend occurred in Denmark.  
 Efforts to introduce private enterprise in these publicly-financed services are one 
of the issues dividing the Social Democrats from the centrist and conservative parties. 
Former Swedish Social Democratic Finance Minister Par Nuder says, "We have private 
providers, but it hasn't been a success. It's one thing to aim for higher efficiency, but we 
have had too many scandals about substandard care by private firms in the elderly care 
sector. So, I'm not sure it's a success. However, we are not fundamentalists on this issue. 
We do have private providers in some areas."30 
 Meanwhile, government spending and taxes also had to rise to finance all of these 
much-desired services. Back in 1960, Swedish taxes were no higher than those 
elsewhere, 29% of GDP in Sweden versus 26% in the OECD as a whole. But by 1986, 
they had risen to 50% of GDP. In Denmark, government spending doubled from 23% of 
GDP in 1958 to 50% of by the mid-1970s (Figure 24). The problem is not the size of 
government spending per se, but how the money is raised and how well it is used. For 
example, one of the complaints in Sweden is that, even though corporate taxes are 
relatively low, job creation is slowed down by heavy reliance on heavy "employment 
taxes," the premiums for health care, pensions, etc, that firms must pay upon hiring 
someone slow down job creation. 
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 Such a generous welfare state only works if there are few "free riders" taking 
advantage of others' generosity. Unfortunately, over time, the number of free riders rose. 
By the late 1980s, 11% of people aged 20-64 were on sick leave or taking early 
retirement. The budgetary burden became increasingly unsustainable. Today, the problem 
is even bigger (Figure 25).  
 Says Swedish State Secretary Hans Lindblad, "It should be profitable to work, but 
we should also have a well-functioning publicly-funded welfare system. The Social 
Democrats abandoned that model a couple decades ago, making it too generous to live on 
the welfare system. We came to a point where it was not stable any longer, especially 
considering the aging of the Swedish society."31 
 By no means were all the problems were in the public sector. On the contrary, just 
as in Japan, anti-competitive devices hindered private sector efficiency. During the 1970s 
and early 1980s, both Sweden and Denmark made futile efforts to maintain some of their 
very large “sunset” industries, particularly textiles and shipbuilding, through outright 
government subsidies and a series of currency devaluations that made Sweden's exports 
cheaper on the international market. This all backfired, says Sweden's former Social 
Democratic Industry Minister Thomas Ostros. "The continuous devaluations gave 
industry the feeling that it didn't have to be on the cutting edge. They felt that the 
government would protect them through devaluation. The result was that productivity 
growth slowed, inflation went up and real wages suffered."32 
 Beyond that, Sweden legally allowed various sorts of cartel activity, such as 
letting competing firms divide up markets. Stefan Folster, chief economist, Confederation 
of Swedish Enterprise, explained, "Cartels were legal. They would divide up the country 
and companies would have monopolies in their region. They were quite common."33 
McKinsey Global Institute contended that "toothless" competition laws in effect allowed 
companies to fix prices across entire industries.34 Just as in Japan, Sweden and Denmark 
imposed regulations--from limits on large-scale stores to regulations concerning hours--
aimed at protecting mom and pop shops.  
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 Eventually, these drains on productivity took their toll on long-term growth, 
reversing what had been a remarkable period of catch-up growth. From 1950 through 
1975, Sweden had risen from the 7th richest country among 19 OECD countries to 3rd, 
from 74% of US per capita GDP to 92%. Then the process reversed. By 1995, Sweden 
had fallen in the ranks to only 14th and only 76% of US per capita GDP. Denmark went 
through a similar, albeit milder, reversal of fortunes. (Figure 26). The end result was the 
crisis of the 1980s-early 1990s that we discussed at the outset. 
 
 
The Way Back; Center Parties Abandon Neoliberalism 
 
The good news that it was possible to fix these problems by making adjustments within 
the Scandinavian model, not by throwing out the whole model. At the time, however, 
there were those who argued that the whole welfare state system had to go. Back in 1993, 
the current Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen of the Liberal Party, wrote a 
book, “From the Social State to the Minimal state” pushing a neoliberal approach akin to 
that of Reagan and Thatcher. The current Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt of 
the Moderate Party, took the same line during the same year in a book called, “The 
Sleeping People.” 
 However, the experience of trying to rule with such policies, and then suffering 
eventual defeat, forced both to abandon neoliberalism.35 In fact, the Swedish party now 
refers to itself as “the new Moderates,” in a deliberate echo of Bill Clinton’s talk of “the 
new Democrats” in the US. 
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 "I am very much a new Moderate," says Hans Lindblad. In fact, his boss, Finance 
Minister Anders Borg, was a key architect of the party's change. "When I looked at the 
polices of the old Moderates, it was clear to me that the party did not deserve more than 
10% of the vote because their policies only benefited 10% of the people. We had to adapt 
to what are ordinary people's problems today, not just what were rich people's problems 
yesterday. We feel that we have to do reform in small steps. In addition, we have to make 
sure that the effect of reform on income redistribution is regarded as fair. If reforms are 
not accepted by the people, you cannot implement them."36 
 The same process occurred in Denmark. "If we had spoken 15 years ago," 
explained Danish Employment Minister Claus Hjort Frederiksen, "I would probably have 
said that some of the problems in our country were that unemployment allowances were 
too high, that social benefits were too high, that we had to strengthen the private sector, 
and weaken the public sector. But, as the years have gone by, we realized that there is a 
great consensus in the Danish society that, if you lose your job or get sick, you should be 
able to keep up your standard of living and not lose your house, that you should have free 
education and health care. We see these as basic elements in the modern welfare state. 
We could see that we lost elections because people were scared that we would be too 
harsh. So, 1998 when we lost the elections by one seat in parliament, we decided that we 
had to change our policies and establish that we were in the center of the Danish political 
spectrum."37 
 The Social Democrats, too, have had to moderate their views, although they have 
been less enthusiastic to talk about it. Still, says former Swedish Social Democratic 
Finance Minister Nuder, "The differences between the two Social Democrats and the 
center-right coalition has narrowed. That's because the two extremes—Communism and 
neoliberalism—have both failed. In fact, in the last election, the Moderate party claimed 
they were better Social Democrats than we were."38 
 The precondition for every other reform was restoring macroeconomic stability, a 
path pursued by both Social Democratic and center-right coalitions. Today, the 
Scandinavian countries run steady budget and current account surpluses, along with low 
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and stable inflation. They have disciplined their monetary policy and their currencies by 
tying themselves to the Eurozone. 
 However, it took unpopular measures, including spending cuts and tax hikes, to 
achieve this stability. In Sweden this amounted to a swing in the budget balance equal to 
15% of GDP in just five years. Some of this came naturally through economic recovery. 
But much of it did come from unpopular policy measures. This hardly rolled back the 
welfare state; in 2006, spending as a share of GDP was 51% in Denmark and 55% in 
Sweden. But it did mean some tightening up on benefits, such as raising the retirement 
age, slightly reducing the size of unemployment benefits in Sweden and enforcing stricter 
go-to-work requirements in Denmark. In many cases, these reforms were passed by a 
consensus agreement between the Social Democrats and the center and right parties. 
 State Secretary Lindblad claimed that the measures passed by his center-right 
coalition are already working. "When we took over in 2006, a nurse on sick leave 
wouldn't gain a single krona [the Swedish currency] by going back to work. We reduced 
unemployment compensation allowances and made a smaller reduction in sick leave pay, 
and we stepped up monitoring to ensure that those who are able to work do in fact go 
back to work. Already, sick leaves are down 13%. The one million people out of work 
that I mentioned earlier (see again Figure 23) has come down by 164,000 people in the 
last year."39 Of course, some analysts—including a Moderate party member of 
parliament with whom we spoke--said that the job growth and reduction of people on sick 
leave and early retirement has more to do with the ongoing economic boom than the 
reforms. 
 Even the Moderate and Liberal parties follow a very different approach from their 
conservative counterparts in the US, UK and Japan. For example, these parties argue that 
the unemployment program is so generous and taxes are so high that a low-skill worker 
does not substantially improve his finances by going to work. Rather than drastically 
cutting benefits, the Moderates and Liberals either already have, or are proposing to, cut 
taxes on these low income workers to give them more incentive. What a far cry from the 
Reaganite emphasis on tax cuts for the wealthy. 
 
                                                 
39 December 2007 interview with author. 
33 
 Globalization, Competitions and Productivity 
 
Macroeconomic stability is just the precondition. The real work is enhancing the growth 
and efficiency leg of the three-legged stool. Some of this has been achieved by far-
reaching deregulation of heavily regulated or state-owned enterprises, such as 
telecommunications. 
 Perhaps even more important were measures that increased competition in the 
private sector. One of the chief weapons in this effort was exposing more of the domestic 
economies to international competition. Sweden, Norway and Finland joined the 
European Union in 1995; Denmark had already joined the European Community in 1973. 
 Joining the EU meant adhering to EU competition laws. Many of the anti-
competitive devices had to be scrapped. "In joining the EU," explained industry 
federation economist Folster, "Sweden had to introduce competition law, which didn't 
really exist before that. Deregulation of restrictions on large stores has caused high food 
prices to drop toward EU levels."40 
 However, Folster stressed, the real competitive impact came not from following 
EU rules, but from the increase in globalization on the ground. The ratio of trade to GDP 
(in current prices) in Denmark and Sweden rose from about half of GDP in the 1960s to 
around 90% today (Figure 27a). The cumulative stock of inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) soared from 5-7% in 1990 to around half in 2006 (Figure 26b). On the 
import side of the equation, the main benefit was an increased in competition which 
spurred domestic firms to either improve or stand aside. "Having a domestic monopoly 
doesn't give you that much power when imports are half of the market," said Folster. 
 At the same time, Sweden upgraded its "human capital," says Ostros. "In three 
years, from 1994 to 1997, we turned a budget deficit equal to 12% of GDP—a record for 
a modern industrial country--into a surplus. However, even during this period of budget-
cutting, we invested heavily in education, including adult education, and R&D." Sweden 
rapidly increased the number of PhD-level engineers as well as adult education for 
ordinary workers. Meanwhile, spending on Research and Development (R&D) increased 
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to 4% of GDP, of which 1% is government money and 3% private industry money. 
 The result was a technological transformation of the country. Back in the 1970s-
80s, Sweden's exports focused on resource-intensive and medium-technology products. 
But in the last decade, with global competitors like Ericsson, Sweden has become a high-
tech power. During the 1990s, the share of medium-high and high technology industries 
in Sweden’s trade increased from 18% to 25%. Since the majority of Sweden’s high tech 
products are exported, the export drive led a domestic transformation. By 1999, 10% of 
Sweden’s private sector GDP consisted of high-tech and medium-high-tech goods and 
services, higher than the OECD average of 8.8%. 
 In certain key industries, intensified competition forced leaps in productivity, 
according to a 2006 study by McKinsey Global Institute. Back in the early 1990s, 
automotive productivity in Sweden was 20% below that in Japan. Today, Sweden's auto 
productivity is as high as in Japan, 5% higher than in the US and 40% higher than in 
Germany and France. Back in the 1990s, retail productivity was 20% behind that in the 
US. Since then, deregulation and new competition has caused retail productivity to leap 
ahead 4.6% a year.41 
 In Sweden, this was definitely done via a "big company" model. For example, 
Ericsson's R&D alone comprises 1% of the entire 4% of GDP in R&D done by Sweden. 
Another 1% is done by AstraZeneca, the world's seventh largest pharmaceutical firms. 
So, two firms do half of Sweden's entire R&D. Just ten companies account for a full 40% 
of all Swedish exports. 
 In Denmark, a similar process of globalization-led productivity reforms occurred 
following the 1986 decision by the EU to create a true single market across the EU. 
However, Denmark's capitalism is that of small and medium sized firms. And, rather than 
produce high-tech products, Denmark uses high-tech processes in ordinary products. 
 The whole experience of crisis and recovery has taught the Nordics the skills of 
adaptability, says Ove Pedersen. Crises are endemic in capitalism, says Pedersen, so the 
key thing for a country is to institutionalize mechanisms that provide an early warning 
system and the ability to adapt. "Openness and adaptability are closely linked. But the 
link has to be there for a number of years. You develop the skill of adaptability, by being 
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forced to adapt. As small, open economies, the Scandinavians have been forced to learn 
adaptability. The learning mechanism has been institutionalized into our consensus 
decision-making politics."42 
 In Japan, by contrast, competition from globalization lags. The stock of FDI is 
low relative to GDP. Despite an increase in the price-adjusted ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP, Japan not only imports too little, but also exports too little for a country 
with its population, per capita GDP, and distance from trading partners--at least as 
measured by nominal trade, the only data we have (Figure 28). Moreover, a very large 
proportion of the increase in manufacturing trade is with Japan's overseas affiliates (e.g. 
Matsushita importing TVs from its affiliates in Malaysia while exporting parts to it, 
rather than Japan importing Lucky Goldstar TVs and exporting parts to it). From fiscal 
1996 through 2005, 22% of the increase in total imports (not just manufacturing imports) 
came from Japan's own affiliates. During the same period, a whopping 62% of the growth 
in total exports was in exports to Japanese affiliates, mostly in Asia. While interfirm trade 
is a widespread phenomenon, it is intrafirm trade that really provides a competitive kick. 
 
 
Future of the Scandinavian Welfare State 
 
Can the Scandinavia welfare state survive? It has many assets going for it. But it also 
faces two major challenges. 
 As in other industrial democracies, one of the biggest challenges is aging. In 
Sweden, the working age population will start to fall in 2008. Denmark, the working age 
population is projected to fall from 67% of the total population today to 62% by 2030. 
Certainly, this can be countered by fighting early retirement or the number of people on 
sick leave. Klaus Rasmussen, Chief Economist at the Confederation of Danish Industries, 
says cutting taxes on middle and upper-income people would lead them to work more 
hours, though this is in dispute even by members of the Liberal Party.43 
 But the real answer is good productivity growth. Certainly, Sweden has done a lot 
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better than in the past, 2.5% a year growth in private sector growth per worker since 
1995, and 2% a year overall. Looking at GDP per hour, rather than per worker, Sweden 
also shows superior results: 2.4% a year during 1995-2004, nearly twice the Eurozone 
rate of 1.24% and just behind the US at 2.5%. Finland and Norway have also done well in 
the last decade at 2.3% and 2.2% respectively (Figure 29). Looking at growth in Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP), Finland and Sweden came in third and fourth among 18 
OECD countries at 2.2% and 1.6% a year respectively during 1995-2005. They both beat 
the American achievement of 1.55%. But economists are not sure if this is just a 
temporary spurt resulting from the past decade of reforms, or whether it can be sustained. 
 On the other hand, while Denmark has done better than the rest of Europe, it has 
not done as well as Sweden, Norway or Finland. Denmark's growth in GDP per worker 
were 2% a year in the private sector and 1.6% overall during the last decade (review 
Figure 1). Looking at GDP per hour rather than per worker makes the recent Danish 
figures look disappointing, only 1.3% a year, less even than the Eurozone's 1.4% (see 
Figure 29 again). Moreover, this is less than half the Danish growth rate of 2.4% during 
1985-94. Denmark also did very poorly in the last decade when it comes to TFP growth: 
virtual zero growth. This is a sharp comedown from 1985-1995, when Danish TFP grew 
1.5% a year, the fourth highest in the OECD and significantly higher than America's 
0.9% growth rate. 
 Why, despite all of the other Danish achievements in GDP per capita, GDP per 
worker, lowering unemployment and such, has Danish productivity as measured by GDP 
per hour and TFP done so poorly? It's especially mysterious considering the both the 
performance of other Nordic states and the particular fluidity of Danish labor markets and 
the high rate of firm turnover. Danish Employment Minister Claus Hjort Frederiksen 
argues that, as Denmark drew more lower-skilled, less productive workers form the 
unemployment rolls into work, that dragged down the average.44 Hence, there is the 
possibility that productivity growth will accelerate further in the future. Private sector 
productivity growth (per worker) did accelerate to 2.5% a year during 2003-06. And 
Denmark's growth in GDP per hour revived to 1.8% in 2003 and 2.4% in 2004 (Sweden's 
was 2.7%). But it remains to be seen whether this improvement will be sustained.  
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  Without even more improvement in productivity growth, many economists 
believe that Denmark's long-term potential GDP growth could be limited to 1.5% a year. 
That makes it is disappointing that neither Rasmussen of the employers federation nor 
Steen Jorgensen, an economist at the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions, place much 
emphasis on increasing productivity growth. Indeed, Jorgensen dismisses the poor figures 
in the public sector and services in general as a measurement problem.45  
 Besides better productivity growth, the other long-run answer to the labor 
shortage is more immigration, says former Swedish Finance Minister Par Nuder. But 
immigration poses big problems both economically and politically. Already in Denmark, 
immigrants have risen from less than 3% of the population in 1980 to more than 6% 
today. In Sweden, immigrants have risen from 4% of the population in 1960 to 12% 
today. Unlike a few decades ago when most immigrants to Sweden were recruited to 
shore up the labor force, today, almost half of all immigrants to Sweden are refugees 
from the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East or other trouble spots. Both skill levels and 
employment levels are lower among immigrants (e.g. 81% employment rate among 
native-born Danes versus 66% among the foreign-born) and reliance on social benefits is 
higher. 
 The third challenge, striking at the heart of the Scandinavian model, is the growth 
of "free riders," who take advantage of the system by using sick leave or unemployment 
benefits excessively. How to deal with this is one of the major divisions between the 
current governments in Denmark and Sweden and the opposition Social Democrats. 
 As in other parts of Europe, many Danes and Swedes complain that immigrants 
take advantage of the social systems benefits without contributing enough. There is a bit 
of a backlash, though it is less severe than in countries like France. The Swedish anti-
immigrant party is very rightist and none of the mainstream parties will work with it. It 
won only 3% of the vote for parliament last time, but it won lots of seats in municipal 
elections. In Denmark, the anti-immigrant party is far milder and far bigger. It won 13% 
of the vote in the most recent election. 
 Can the Scandinavian welfare state survive as the society becomes more 
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heterogeneous or does it depend on a feeling of community that based on the notion of 
everyone being alike? Optimists say the immigration issue has been around for a long 
time and it can be dealt with; others are not so sure. 
 These problems are hardly unique to Scandinavia. So, just as the rest of the world 
is watching how Scandinavia is successfully dealing with other problems faced by rich 
countries, such as unemployment and globalization, so it will watch how it deals with 
aging and immigration as well. 
 
 
Scandinavia Is Not Unique; Globalization and Social Safety Nets Go Together 
 
If the Scandinavian blend of market efficiency and globalization with egalitarianism and 
a strong social safety net were unique, then the prospects of Japan or the US or any other 
country emulating the best parts of its model would be very limited. But the fact is that 
some of its features are seen in many other countries in Europe.  
 Importantly, this trend refutes a false proposition commonly accepted on both the 
left and the right: that globalization makes it impossible for states to provide social 
welfare and social insurance or income equality, that globalization implies a “race to the 
bottom.” Supposedly, countries with strong social welfare policies and income equality 
will be less competitive in trade markets while foreign capital will flee states that raise 
taxes to finance social welfare measures.  
 Ever since political scientist Peter Katzenstein wrote Small States in World 
Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe46 back in 1985 it has been known what many small 
states with high levels of foreign trade, not just those in Scandinavia, provide high 
degrees of income equality and social welfare through government measures. A spate of 
research by economists since then has documented and updated Katzenstein’s findings. 
 In fact, the “race to the bottom” thesis has it exactly the opposite. In reality, 
countries that are more open to trade tend to spend even more on social welfare measures. 
Trade and social welfare spending, in fact, amplify each other. For good reason. Social 
welfare spending provides the safety net that makes populations willing to accept the 
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risks of globalization. In turn, free trade provides the higher growth that helps finance 
social welfare measures.  
 Compare the social safety net to fire insurance or a futures market in farm 
products. Because people can buy fire insurance, they are more willing to buy their own 
home and so more homes get built and bought. Because farmers can get a guaranteed 
price for their products months in advance—and shift the risk to someone else—they are 
more willing to grow more food. We get cheaper food as a result. 
 On the one hand, trade and FDI enable a country to grow faster and get richer—
on average. On the other hand, trade and FDI create more variance and dislocation. 
Firstly, they can cause more variance in growth from year to year, e.g. Scandinavia went 
into depression partly as a result of the collapse of their export market in the Soviet 
Union. Secondly, they create more variance among the country’s citizens, e.g., more 
factory closings, more shifts from job to job, more dislocation for those with little 
education, growing inequality of income, etc. Consequently, countries that are more 
globalized face political pressure either to close off trade or to fight these dislocations 
with government policies. Typically, the left calls for protectionism while the right calls 
for small government. In reality, small countries are in no position to run autarchies and, 
increasingly, neither are large ones. The products of modern life require a division of 
labor involving tens of millions, or hundreds of millions of people. Imagine a country of 
10 million trying to produce all its food and cars and chemical products, etc. Hence, on 
average, countries that are more globalized find it necessary to protect their citizens. 
 Katzenstein himself discussed the research documenting this trend in a 2003 essay 
entitled, “Small States and Small States Revisited.” He writes: 
 
David Cameron had demonstrated that openness to international trade correlates highly 
with social spending levels that were exceptionally generous in small states. Two decades 
later Geoffrey Garrett consolidated that finding. Updating Cameron’s trade analysis and 
extending the analysis of trade to capital markets, Garrett’s statistical analysis supports 
the conclusion that openness does not undercut national choice, including for social 
democratic regimes that seek to strike a balance between efficiency and equity. Garrett’s 
provocative analysis is a useful corrective to the view, widely shared in the 1990s, that 
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footloose capital was all but eliminating national choices.47 
 
 Cameron, for example, found that the best single predictor of an increase in the 
tax share of GDP among OECD countries between 1960 and 1975 was the economy’s 
trade:GDP ratio in 1960.48 The correlation was a very high 0.78. One of the best recent 
studies documenting, explaining, and expanding on upon this finding via careful 
econometric regressions involving 100 countries is Dani Rodrik’s “Why Do More Open 
Economies Have Bigger Governments.” 
 
There is a positive and robust partial correlation between openness, as measured by the 
share of trade in GDP, and the scope of government, as measured by the share of 
government expenditure in GDP…[This pattern] prevails for both low- and high-income 
countries…In addition, openness in the early 1960s is a statistically significant predictor 
of the expansion of government consumption over the subsequent three decades 
[emphasis in original]… 
 Government consumption appears to play an insulating role in economies subject 
to external shocks. Societies seem to demand (and receive) a larger government sector as 
the price for accepting larger doses of external risk.49 
 
 A couple back of the envelope calculations show that Rodrik’s finding still holds 
today despite all the talk of “a race to the bottom.” As we can see in Figure 30a, among 
OECD countries, those that trade more (higher trade:GDP ratio) have higher government 
spending on social services as a share of GDP. Nor do rich countries have to worry about 
driving away foreign capital if they spend “too much” on social spending. There is no 
statistically significant relationship between inward stock of FDI and social spending 
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Can The Land of The Rising Sun Learn From the Lands of the Midnight Sun? 
 
"How do you like being a star, with everyone coming to learn from you?" we asked 
Danish Employment Minister Frederiksen. He laughed and then, like so many others in 
Denmark and Sweden, discounted the notion that others could simply copy a complex 
multi-part system that has taken the Scandinavians decades to build. Moreover, said 
Frederiksen, "I don't believe in the 'one size fits all' approach. Each country has to adopt 
the practices that suit it best." Then, in virtually the same words used by everyone else we 
spoke to, he concluded, "You can't copy us, but it is possible to learn from our 
experience." 
 The good news is that one of Japan's best skills as a nation, ever since the 1871 
Iwakura Mission, is learning about the "best practices" of other nations and then adapting 
them to Japanese needs and ways of doing things. 
 The first lesson for Japan in learning from Scandinavia is that this is not like a 
"combination platter" menu at a Chinese restaurant: one choice from column A; two 
choices from Column B. Many parts of the Scandinavian model only work well because 
they are linked to other parts. For example, neither flexibility nor security works well 
without the other. As Frederiksen explained, "I have had many visits at this table over the 
past five years from French ministers and politicians, German ministers, Spanish 
ministers. They are all very interested in the flexibility part of our system, i.e. the easier 
rules for hiring and firing people. However, when it comes to the crux of the system, the 
security part, then their interest drops. That's because it means they have to spend a lot of 
money to pay these high allowances and run these active labor market policies."50 
 This does not mean that it's an "all or nothing" proposition, but attention must be 
paid to the mutual dependence of various policy planks. 
 The second lesson is that even the best policies don't work unless they have a 
supportive institutional context. The same policies work differently in different countries 
because people behave very differently depending on the institutional context. 
 What is it that makes the flexicurity philosophy so popular, workable, and 
sustainable in Scandinavia? At least one answer is one that might meet the approval of 
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Mancur Olson: very inclusive institutions built up over decades. In Denmark, about 80% 
of workers are in unions, while the employers federation includes companies with 55% of 
all private sector workers. Similar trends prevail in Sweden. 
 Because of this centralization, when workers and firms bargain, they don’t just 
think about their own firm or industry; they have to think about the impact on the 
economy as a whole. Unions know they cannot demand such high nominal wages as to 
price their exports out of the market or force inflation. That's one of the reasons Sweden's 
employers federation returned to coordinated bargaining after having withdrawn in 1990. 
At the same time, management knows it must enhance the skills and safety of the labor 
force to compete. The Scandinavians have a very low rate of workplace injuries. 
 An example of this was shown in a study on the differences of Danish and British 
company responses to retraining programs. Professors Cathie Jo Martin of Boston 
University and Duane Swank of Marquette University found that, because Danish 
employers are organized into a high centralized federation, they have a sense of their 
collective interests as employers. They see training as a "public good" from which they 
will ultimately benefit as knowledge diffuses throughout the labor force. Moreover, 
Danish companies are more willing than British firms to pay taxes for active labor market 
programs and participate in on the job training programs like the House of Prince we 
discussed above. In Britain, where employers are less centrally organized, companies are 
more likely to take an attitude of "every man for himself." They hold back on training out 
of fear that the money they spent on training might be lost as the upgraded worker went 
to another firm.51 
 The thinking is different in Scandinavia, explained Professor Steen Navrbjerg of 
the University of Copenhagen, "A Danish CEO told me that, if he trained a worker, the 
risk was that the worker would leave. But, said the CEO, there was a bigger risk. What if 
he didn’t train the worker and that worker stayed?”52 
 At present, big Japanese firms deal with this dilemma by practicing "internal 
flexibility," i.e. on the job training and job shifting with the firm. So, they get the benefit 
from their investment in training. But this causes Japan to lose "external flexibility" and 
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makes the worker too dependent on the fortunes of his own firm. It also works a lot less 
well for the vast majority of Japanese who work for small and medium firms. And it also 
works a lot less well for big firms in sunset industries.53 
 The third lesson is that, after a while, institutions create attitudes that reinforce 
both the institutions and the policies. The ability of these policies to work well depends 
on these attitudes. Creating these attitudes cannot be accomplished overnight.  
 Trust is one of the most important attitudes, emphasized Soren Andersen, a 
specialist in labor-management relations at the University of Copenhagen. "Scandinavian 
workers are willing to provide firms with flexibility because they really trust that they 
will get security in return." Workers embrace globalization and technological 
improvement because they trust that they will be taken care of if they lose their job. They 
are willing to pay high taxes because they trust that the revenues will be used in a 
universalistic system that provides benefits for most people. Employers trust that if they 
support the system of security and equality, they will get flexibility. Long experience has 
shown that this trust is rewarded. Trust is not easily or quickly built. "The other day, I 
had a visit from French unions who wanted to learn about Flexicurity," said Andersen. 
"They liked the security part. But, they felt, that, even if they offered employers more 
flexibility, they wouldn't get society-wide security in return. They'd just get 
'Flexploitation' [a combination of flexibility and exploitation]."54 
 Another important attitude is that social benefits are designed to enhance the 
feeling of all citizens that "we're all in this together." Benefits like free health care or free 
child care are "universalistic," i.e. they are provided to everyone, not just to the 
"deserving poor." As a result, most everyone feels that, "We pay high taxes, but we're 
also the ones who get the benefits. We all get sick. We all need education. We all risk 
losing our job. We all get old." 
 Former Swedish Finance Minister Nuder underlined that the universality of the 
benefits generated both efficiency and trust in the system. "A universal system can be 
cost-effective. Compare our health system to that in the US. Secondly, there is no doubt 
that the universality of the system is critical to maintaining political support for it. Even 
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the wealthiest Swedes can take benefits from the system. We don't want a system where 
you have to pinpoint those who are in need for others' charity. In the long run, that would 
lead to a situation where the rich and the middle class start to question why they should 
pay high taxes if they don't get the benefits."55 
 This is also, by the way, why the perception of refugee immigrants or others 
taking advantage of sick leave or unemployment benefits is so corrosive: it undermines 
the trust and social cohesion that is the sine qua non of the system. 
 By contrast, in countries like the US where, among non-retirees, only the poor get 
free medical care, many citizens feel: "We pay the taxes, but they get the benefits." 
Hence, voter support for such programs is low. Similarly, as more American parents, 
dissatisfied with the public schools, send their children to private schools, they are less 
willing to pay taxes to support the public schools. So, the public schools get worse and 
more people abandon them in a vicious cycle. 
 Without trust, governments can be immobilized. When Scandinavian 
governments were forced to dispense harsh medicine in the 1980s and 1990s to get out of 
crisis—and at later points as well--voters swallowed it because they were convinced it 
would be done fairly. Professors Junko Kato and Bo Rothstein contrast this with Japan, 
where, "a minimal welfare state and previous policies of directing government funds to 
special interests (e.g., in the form of construction projects and rice subsidies) meant that 
the majority of citizens did not consider public expenditures to be particularly useful or 
legitimate. This had a big impact on government's credibility and ability to implement 
policy. "Social Democrats in Sweden were able to convince the public that increased 
taxes and cuts in benefits were plausible measures to eliminate deficits and so guarantee 
the long-term viability of the Swedish welfare state. In Japan, by contrast, arguments 
about the need to raise taxes to cover government deficits were met with skepticism.”56 
 How then, we asked Frederiksen, could a country like Japan switch from a system 
of job security, i.e. protecting a person at his current job, to the income/employment 
security embodied in Scandinavia's Flexicurity philosophy. "You could start," he replied, 
"with making sure that certain benefits are not tied to a single employer. In southern 
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Europe, to get a pension you have to work at the same company until you retire. 
Otherwise you lose all the money you have put into your pension plan. To our mind, this 
binds people to a single company in a bad way. You have to rethink the concept that it is 
the company that provides everything from child care to the pension. If that system 
exists, you cannot create flexibility."57 
 Just as the Anglo-American path is not the only path to reform, neither is the 
Scandinavian path. We do not live in a "one size fits all" world. Japan needs to pick and 
choose the combination of global "best practices"—including Japan's own best practices--
that work best for Japan. Japan does not need to remold itself into either the American 
model or the Scandinavian model. It needs to forge a revitalized Japanese model. But in 
doing so, it can learn from others, just as the Iwakura mission did way back when. 
 
 
Afterthoughts on Ideology, Circles of Trust, and Transferability 
 
I wanted to add some more speculative ruminations that bear on the transferability of 
Scandinavian policies to Japan or the US. These comments should be taken in the spirit 
of "thinking out loud." 
 One is the role of ideology or "hot button" issues. Outsiders often think of 
modern-day Scandinavian politics as particularly pragmatic, rational and calm—though, 
as we stressed at the outset, this was not always the case. One reason, perhaps, is that 
most of the political divisions center around material issues rather cultural/ideological 
ones. Matters of material concern can be compromised. But when it comes to principle, 
status, honor, social identity, or the word of God, compromise feels more like betrayal.  
 In the US, this not only takes the form of a high political salience for issues like 
abortion, gun control, and Darwin, but it also invests even material issues—from global 
warming to the use of phonetics in reading classes to the distributional effects of tax 
rates--with an ideological fervor and partisan bent.  
 In Japan, we have the legacy of World War II. Consider how Yasukuni was 
allowed to interfere so much in Japan-China economic relations. So many of today's 
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leading politicians, in defending Japan's behavior in the 1930s-40s, are defending not just 
the honor of the nation, but their own grandfathers. Shinzo Abe tried, and failed, to 
introduce an ideological bent to issues of constitutional revision and educational reform. 
In his case, it utterly failed. Voters couldn’t see his priority on such ideological issues 
instead of their day-to-day problems. Whether his failure was a problem of the message 
or the messenger remains unclear. In any case, when society is so polarized around "hot 
button" issues, it is bound to affect the cohesiveness needed for a Scandinavian-style 
society-wide social safety net. It also affects how coalitions are built among legislators. 
 A second issue is trust in government. In Scandinavia, my sense is that 
government is seen by most people as, at least potentially, an instrument of the general 
interest and collective will. Historians say this stems from the Social Democratic 
takeover in the 1930s so that the labor movement saw government as an instrument of its 
needs and no longer its enemy. Despite grumbling about this or that, people trust 
government, see the government as an expression of themselves, and are willing to turn 
over control of half of GDP to it. When a Scandinavian politician proposes to cut taxes, 
many people may like it but they also ask: what program do you want to cut to finance 
the tax cut (it is not persuasive in Scandinavia to claim that the tax cut will pay for itself 
because tax revenues will rise).  
 In Japan and the US, by contrast, government in particular and concentrated 
power in general, are more feared, or at least distrusted, as an alien power. Here again I 
suspect that, for Japan, this is partly a legacy of World War II. Ordinary citizens fear that 
a government with too much power could run amok. It may also be a reflection of the 
inordinate power of a non-elected bureaucracy in a one-party democracy. This distrust of 
power is reflected in the fact that Koizumi was so often attacked as a "fascist" by 
members of his own LDP for doing things that chief executives regularly do in other rich 
democracies. And yet, Koizumi's ability to increase the power of the prime minister and 
gain so much popularity for doing so—especially in the 2005 Diet elections--shows that 
these attitudes are not immutable. 
 In today's America, analogous attitudes are reflected in Reagan's slogan, 
"Government is not the solution; it's the problem," the effectiveness of the "tax and 
spending liberal" epithet, and Bill Clinton's declaration that, "the era of big government is 
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over." 
 A final issue relating to Japan is the "circles of trust." My sense is that, in Japan, 
there is a high level of trust within the "circle of trust," but that these circles are drawn 
fairly narrowly. Certain patterns of interaction remind me of Robert Axelrod's Evolution 
of Cooperation. 58 Axelrod describes how repeated interaction among even strangers, 
even enemies, can gradually create not just a behavioral pattern of cooperation, but even 
an ethic around it. In one stark example, French and German soldiers in WWI trenches 
who faced the same units for years gradually developed certain rules of thumb about de 
facto truces during holidays, the Sabbath, certain hours, etc. This behavior gradually 
turned into an ethic invested with emotion and soldiers disciplined members of their own 
side who violated the ethic. Finally, to end this cooperative "game," the generals had to 
move their units so that their soldiers now faced enemies with no history of interaction. 
 Production keiretsu remind me of this sort of cooperation. An executive from 
Honda once explained why the auto transplants were so reluctant to buy from, i.e. depend 
upon, American parts suppliers as opposed to their own subcontractors, many of whom 
moved with them. He said that the just-in-time system and kaizen and the like all required 
absolute trust in the absolute reliability of the partner, and also required that each partner 
have a very good sense of the other so as to be able to anticipate the other's evolving 
needs. This is something that could only be built up over years and years. Trust born of 
endlessly repeated interaction is a very different kind of trust than that born of society-
wide morality that dictates how one acts even toward a stranger with whom one has never 
had previous contact and with whom one will never have contact again. The latter allows 
a wider circle of trust. 
 So, when it comes to security, Japanese regular workers justifiably have more 
trust that their employer will not just thrown them on the dustbin than do American 
workers. But they don't have the society-wide trust born of the Scandinavia-style social 
safety net. Can one introduce the society-wide social safety net without the same society-
wide circle of trust? 
 In this "chicken and egg" interplay of ideas and institutions, I suspect that each is 
both chicken and egg. To mix metaphors, it may seem like a Catch-22: can't change 
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Japanese institutions until one changes attitudes; can't change attitudes until one changes 
institutions. But the fact is that many of today's institutions, including the labor market 
institutions, are deliberate creations of governmental and private policymakers during the 
20th century. They are not reflections of age-old Japanese culture, but adaptations to a 
particular situation that have, in some regards, outlived their usefulness.59 They are not 
immutable. What people created, people can modify, albeit not overnight. That's what 
leadership is all about. 
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 Figure 3b  Denmark Has High Turnover Rate 
 
Source: OECD 2004 
Note: Data from 1998-2000 
 
 
Figure 3d  US New Firms Can Really Grow 
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Figure 5b:   



















































































Market distribution of national income 
 
 Poorest 30%  Middle 40% Richest 30% Ratio* 
Japan  13.7%  35.1% 51.2% 3.7 
Finland 10.2% 35.0% 54.8% 5.4 
Norway  8.8% 37.0% 54.2% 6.2 
Sweden   8.0%  35.0% 57.0% 7.1 
Denmark  7.8% 37.6% 54.6% 7.0 
US  7.6%  32.8% 59.6% 7.8 
Average  8.1%  34.4% 57.6% 7.1 
 
 
Distribution after taxes and government spending 
 
 Poorest 30%  Middle 40% Richest 30% Ratio* 
Denmark 17.6% 38.2% 44.2% 2.5 
Finland 17.5% 37.2% 45.3% 2.6 
Sweden  17.2%  37.9% 44.9% 2.6 
Norway 16.0% 37.2% 46.8% 2.9 
Japan  15.7%  36.5% 47.8% 3.0 
US  11.5%  35.0% 53.5% 4.7 
Average  15.2%  36.4% 48.5% 3.2 
 
 
Impact of government taxes and spending 
 
 Poorest 30%  Middle 40% Richest 30% 
Denmark 9.8% 0.6% -10.4% 
Sweden  9.2%  2.9% -12.1% 
Finland 7.3% 2.2% - 9.5% 
Norway 7.2% 0.2% - 7.4% 
US  3.9%  2.2% - 6.1% 
Japan  2.0%  1.4% - 3.4% 
Average 7.1%  2.0% - 9.1% 
 
 
Source: OECD 1998. Data on 12 countries from 1995 (latest available for all the data) 





 Table 2b: Three Models Of Capitalism 
 
(Working age only) 
 
 
Market distribution of national income 
 
 Poorest 30%  Middle 40% Richest 30% Ratio* 
Norway 11.5% 36.0% 52.5% 4.6 
Japan 11.4% 35.9% 52.7% 4.6 
Sweden 10.9% 36.1% 53.0% 4.9 
Finland 10.3% 35.9% 53.8% 5.2 
Denmark 9.7% 37.2% 53.1% 5.5 
United States 8.6% 32.6% 58.8% 6.8 
Average 10.1% 34.7% 55.2% 5.5 
 
 
Distribution after taxes and government spending 
 
 Poorest 30%  Middle 40% Richest 30% Ratio* 
Norway 16.4% 36.6% 47.0% 2.9 
Denmark 16.0% 42.9% 41.1% 2.6 
Sweden 15.5% 42.1% 42.4% 2.7 
Finland 14.8% 41.5% 43.8% 3.0 
Japan 11.7% 41.3% 47.0% 4.0 
United States 10.9% 39.2% 49.9% 4.6 
Average 13.7% 39.8% 46.6% 3.4 
 
 
Impact of government taxes and spending 
 
 Poorest 30%  Middle 40% Richest 30% 
Denmark 6.3% 5.7% -12.0% 
Norway 4.9% 0.6% -5.5% 
Sweden 4.6% 6.0% -10.6% 
Finland 4.5% 5.5% -10.0% 
United States 2.3% 6.6% -8.9% 
Japan 0.3% 5.4% -5.6% 
Average 3.6% 5.0% -8.6% 
 
 
Source: OECD 2005a and 2007g. Data on 19 countries from 2000 (latest available) 














 Ranking Gini Ranking Gini Ranking Gini 
Norway 1 0.29 3 0.22 13 -0.07
Denmark 2 0.30 2 0.22 11 -0.08
Finland 3 0.31 1 0.20 6 -0.10
Japan 4 0.31 9 0.28 15 -0.03
Sweden 5 0.35 4 0.22 3 -0.12
Germany 6 0.36 6 0.25 5 -0.11
New Zealand 7 0.36 7 0.26 7 -0.10
Canada 8 0.37 11 0.29 10 -0.08
Netherlands 9 0.37 5 0.23 1 -0.14
USA 10 0.38 14 0.33 14 -0.05
Australia 11 0.39 12 0.30 9 -0.09
UK 12 0.39 10 0.28 4 -0.11
France 13 0.39 8 0.27 2 -0.12
Italy 14 0.39 13 0.31 8 -0.09
Greece 15 0.40 15 0.33 12 -0.08
 
 
Source: OECD 2005a 









































































Source: OECD 2007a. 
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Figure 9: Equality and Growth: No Trade-Off 
 







































































Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and Table 2 
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 Figure 10: Average Job Tenure in OECD 
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Table 4:  Danish Unemployment Insurance Replaces Most of Lost Income for 









 Figure 12:   




Source: Bredgaard and Larsen. 
Note: Replacement rate, i.e. unemployment benefits as percentage of former wage. The summary 
measure is defined as the average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two 
earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment.  
 
 




Source: OECD 1997 
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 Figure 14: Lifelong Learning Enables Nordics to Upgrade Their Job Skills 
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Source: EU Labour Force Survey, cited in PowerPoint given to author by professors at the University 
of Copenhagen 
Note: Life-long learning refers to persons aged 25 to 64 who stated that they received 
education or training in the four weeks preceding the survey whether or not the education 













































Scale from 1-10 – the higher the number the more secure, 2001





 Figure 16: US Workers Worst Off When Trade Takes Away a Job 
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Source: Ministry of Finance. Corporate financial statements 
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 Figure 22: Denmark and Sweden 2nd and 3rd Lowest Poverty Rates in the OECD;  
USA and Japan the Highest 
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Source: OECD 2007a 





 Figure 23a   
Performance Gap Between Children of High-Status and Low-Status Parents 
 
Source: OECD 2007e 
Note: The index includes the highest Occupational Status of the parents or guardians, the highest 
level of education of the parents, an index of the educational resources in the home (e.g. a desk to 
study at home) and the number of books at home. 
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Note: Test score inequality measures the ratio of literacy test scores between the 95th and 5th 
percentiles for ages 15-65 during the late 1990s. Wage inequality measures the ratio of wages for the 
90th and 10th percentiles for full-time employees. Unfortunately, Japan is not in the dataset. 
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 Figure 25   
Too Many Working Age People On Sick Leave, Early Retirement, Etc. 
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Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
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Source: OECD (2005b) and World Bank  
Note: R-squared to 0.429 means that 43% of the variation among countries in social spending can be 
explained by their trade openness. 
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Source: OECD (2005c)  
Note: Although the chart appears to indicate that countries with higher social spending actually attract 
FDI, the correlation is not statistically significant, particularly if we remove outlier Japan. 
CENTER ON JAPANESE ECONOMY AND BUSINESS 
Working and Occasional Papers 
 
(Papers can be downloaded free of charge at: http://academiccommons.columbia.edu) 





265  Richard Katz, A Nordic Mirror: Why Structural Reform 
        Has Proceeded Faster in Scandinavia Than in Japan 
264  Robert Grondine, Observations on the Current State of  
Corporate Governance in Japan 
263  Nobuyuki Kinoshita, The Economics of Japan's Postal   
   Services Privatization 
262  Keiko Ito and Sébastien Lechevalier, The Evolution of  
the Productivity Dispersion of Firms – A Reevaluation of  
Its Determinants in the Case of Japan 
261  Terutomo Ozawa,  History Repeats Itself: Evolutionary  
Structural Change and TNCs’ Involvement in  
Infrastructure Overseas, Flying-Geese Style  
260  Sanghoon Ahn, Kyoji Fukao, and Keiko Ito,  
  The Impact of Outsourcing on the Japanese and South  
Korean Labor Markets: International Outsourcing of  
Intermediate Inputs and Assembly in East Asia 
259  Keiko Ito, Moosup Jung, Young Gak Kim, and  
Tangjun Yuan, A Comparative Analysis of 
Productivity Growth and Productivity Dispersion: 
Microeconomic Evidence Based on Listed Firms from 
Japan, Korea, and China 
 
         2007 
258  Yasushi Hamao, Takeo Hoshi, and Tetsuji Okazaki,  
Listing Policy and Development of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange in the Pre-War Period 
257  Ryuichi Nakagawa and Hirofumi Uchida, Herd  
Behavior by Japanese Banks After Financial 
Deregulation in the 1980s 
256  Jie Gan, Collateral, Debt Capacity, and Corporate  
Investment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment 
255  Jie Gan, The Real Effects of Asset Market Bubbles:  
Loan- and Firm-Level Evidence of a Lending Channel 
254  Christian Broda, Nuno Limão, and David E.  
Weinstein, Optimal Tariffs: The Evidence 
253  Hugh Patrick, Japan’s Economy: The Idiosyncratic  
Growth Continues 
252  Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein, Defining  
         Price Stability in Japan: A View from America 
251 Terutomo Ozawa, Professor Kiyoshi Kojima’s    
        Contributions to FDI Theory: Trade, Structural     
        Transformation, Growth, and Integration in East Asia 
250  Hiroki Yamakawa, A Practical Analysis of Transfer   
        Pricing Methodologies for Bilateral Advance Pricing  
        Arrangements 
 
2006 
249  Hugh Patrick, Japan’s Economy: Finally Finding 
Its Way to Full Employment and Sustained Growth 
248  Ulrike Schaede, Competition for Corporate 
Control: Institutional Investors, Investment Funds, 
and Hostile Takeovers in Japan 
247  Ulrike Schaede, The Strategic Logic of Japanese 
Keiretsu, Main Banks and Cross-Shareholdings, 
Revisited 
246  Ricardo Caballero, Takeo Hoshi and Anil K 
Kashyap, Zombie Lending and Depressed 
Restructuring in Japan.  
245  Zekeriya Eser and Joe Peek, Reciprocity and 
Network Coordination: Evidence from Japanese 
Banks.  
244  Hugh Patrick, Japan: Another Economic Recovery, 
New Political Terrain.  
243  Ferenc A. Sanderson, Characteristics of the Hedge 
Fund Industry in Japan.  
 
2005 
242  Mariko Fujii and Makoto Takaoka, Forecasting 
Skewness in Stock Returns: Evidence from 
Frim-Level Data in Tokyo Markets 
241 Robert A. Myers, Challenges for Japanese 
Universities’ Technology Licensing 
Offices—What Technology Transfer in the United 
States Can Tell Us  
240 Takatoshi Ito, Political Economy of Competition 
Policy in Japan: Case of Airline Services 
239 Christina L. Ahmadjian, Stability and Change in 
Embedded Relationships: Broken Ties in Japanese 
Automotive Keiretsu  
238 Nada Mora, The Effect of Bank Credit on Asset 
Prices: Evidence from the Japanese Real Estate 
Boom during the 1980s 
237  Koichi Hamada and Asahi Noguchi, The Role of  
Preconceived Ideas in Macroeconomic Policy: Japan’s  
Experiences in the Two Deflationary Periods 
236  Takatoshi Ito, Monetary Policy Beyond the Zero  
Interest Rate Policy Under Deflation 
235  Hiroyuki Chuma, Takao Kato and Isao Ohashi,  
Worker Discontent, Voice, and EI Programs in Japan 
234  Masami Imai, Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance 
Reform in Japan 
233  Takatoshi Ito and Hugh Patrick, Problems and 
Prescriptions for the Japanese Economy: An Overview  
232  Franklin R. Edwards, New Proposals to Regulate 
Hedge Funds: SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2 
231  Takatoshi Ito and Frederic Mishkin, Monetary Policy 
in Japan: Problems and Solutions 
230  Hugh Patrick, The Japanese Recovery and Growth Not     




229  Takatoshi Ito, Interventions and Japanese Economic  
Recovery 
228 Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein, Happy News  
from the Dismal Science: Reassessing Japanese Fiscal  
Policy and Sustainability  
227  Robert A. Madsen, What Went Wrong Aggregate  
Demand, Structural Reform, and the Politics of 1990s  
Japan 
226 Michael Smitka, Japanese Macroeconomic Dilemmas 
The Implications of Demographics for Growth and 
Stability 
225 Lee Branstetter, Is Foreign Direct Investment a Channel 
of Knowledge Spillovers? Evidence from Japan’s FDI in 
the United States                                                                       
224 Jie Gan, Collateral Channel and Credit Cycle: Evidence 
from the Land Price Collapse in Japan 
 
223 Chung I. Wang, The financial strategies of Japanese 
multinational enterprises and internal capital market 
222 Donald Davis and David Weinstein, A Search for 




221 Christina Ahmadjian and Jaeyong Song, Corporate 
Governance Reform in Japan and South Korea 
220 Hugh Patrick, Evolving Corporate Governance in Japan 
219 Minako Fujiki, Inflation Targeting Discussions in Japan 
– unconventional monetary policy under deflation: How 
People Have Argued; Why the BoJ Opposes Adoption 
218 Adam Posen and Kenneth Kuttner, The Difficulty of  
Discerning What’s Too Tight: Taylor Rules and Japanese 
Monetary Policy 
217  Adam Posen, It Takes More Than a Bubble to Become 
Japan 
216  Naotaka Kawakami,The difference in taxation on 
financial transactions between Japan and the United 
States: Can the U.S. system and theory be the model? 
215 Naotaka Kawakami, What Does the Consumption Tax 
Mean to Japanese and U.S. Society? 
214 Tokuo Iwaisako, Stock Index Autocorrelation and  
Cross-autocorrelations of the Size-Sorted Portfolios 
in the Japanese Market 
213 Minoru Kobayashi, Takeshi Hiromatsu, Naoki 
Tsubone, Manabu Kurita, and Gosei Ohira, 
Economical Impacts on IT to Industries in Japan 
212 William V. Rapp and Mazhar ul Islam, Putting  
 E-Commerce to Work: The Japanese Convenience Store 
Case 
211 Mark J. Scher, Policy Challenges and the Reform of 
Postal Savings in Japan 
210 Takao Kato and Katsuyuki Kubo, CEO Compensation 
and Firm Performance in Japan: Evidence from New 
Panel Data on Individual CEO Pay 
 
2002 
209 Lee Branstetter and Yoshiaki Nakamura, Has Japan’s 
Innovative Capacity Declined? 
208  David O. Beim, Japan’s Internal Debt 
207 Kengo Inoue, Choices for Japanese Fiscal Policy 
206 Takero Doi and Takeo Hoshi, Paying for the FILP 
205 Terutomo Ozawa, Pax-Americana-led 
Macro-Clustering and Flying-Geese Style Catch-Up in 
East Asia: Mechanisms of Regionalized Endogenous 
Growth 
204 Robert Dekle and Heajin Ryoo, Exchange Rate 
Fluctuations, Financing Constraints, Hedging, and 
Exports: Evidence from Firm Level Data     
203 Christina Ahmadjian and Gregory Robbins, A Clash 
of Capitalisms: Foreign Shareholders and Corporate 
Restructuring in 1990s Japan 
202 David Flath and Tatsuhiko Nariu, Parallel Imports and 
the Japan Fair Trade Commission 
201 David Flath, Taxicab Regulation in Japan 
200 David Flath, The Japanese Distribution Sector in 
Economic Perspective: The Large Store Law and Retail 
Density 
199 David Flath, Distribution Keiretsu, FDI and Import 
Penetration in Japan 
198 Yasushi Hamao, Jianping Mei, and Yexiao Xu,  
 Idiosyncratic Risk and Creative Destruction in Japan 
197 Hee-Joon Ahn, Jun Cai, Yasushi Hamao, and 
Richard Y.K. Ho, The Components of the Bid-Ask 
Spread in a Limit-Order Market: Evidence from the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 
196 Donald R. Davis and David E. Weinstein, 
 Technological Superiority and the Losses From 
Migration 
195 Linda Edwards and Margaret Pasquale, 
 Women’s Higher Education in Japan: Family 
Background, Economic Factors, and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law 
194 Andrew Carverhill and Ronald Schramm, 





193 Terutomo Ozawa, The hidden side of the flying geese 
catch-up model: Japan’s dirigiste institutional setup and a 
deepening financial morass 
192 Donald Davis and David Weinstein, Bones, Bombs and 
Break Points: The Geography of Economic Activity 
191 William V. Rapp, Nationwide Financial Services 
190 Lee Branstetter, Is Foreign Direct Investment a Channel 
of Knowledge Spillovers? Evidence from Japan’s FDI in 
the U.S. 
189 Christina Ahmadjian and Patricia Robinson, 
 Downsizing and the Deinstitutionalization of Permanent 
Employment in Japan 
188 Christina Ahmadjian, Changing Japanese Corporate 
Governance 
187 Kazuo Sato, From Fast to Last: The Japanese Economy 
in the 1990s 
186 Hugh Patrick, From Cozy Regulation to Competitive 
Markets: The Regime Shift of Japan’s Financial System 
185 Takao Kato, The End of Lifetime Employment in 
Japan? Evidence from National Surveys and Field 
Research 
184 Takao Kato, The Recent Transformation of 
Participatory Employment Practices in Japan 
183 William Rapp, Nomura Research Institute 
182 Robert Dekle, Demographic Destiny, Per Capita 




181 Maria Vassalou, The Fama-French factors as proxies for 
fundamental economic risks 
180 Yasushi Hamao and Jianping Mei, Living With the 
“Enemy”: An Analysis of Foreign Investment in the 
Japanese Equity Market 
179 Yasushi Hamao and Takeo Hoshi, Bank Underwriting 
of Corporate Bonds: Evidence from Japan after the 
Financial System Reform of 1993. 
178 William Rapp, International Retail Banking:  
The Citibank Group 
177 William Rapp, Automobiles: Toyota Motor Corporation 
176 Shingo Nakazawa, Corporate Investment in Japan:  
How Important are Financial Factors? 
175 Nobuyoshi Yamori & Narunto Nishigaki, Electronic  
Money Projects in Japan 
174 William Rapp, Steel: Nippon Steel, K.K. 
 
1999 
173 Nobuhiko Hibara, Food Retailing: Ito-Yokado Group 
172 William V. Rapp, Steel: Tokyo Steel, K.K. 
171 Yasushi Hamao, Frank Packer & Jay Ritter, 
Institutional Affiliation and the Role of Venture Capital: 
Evidence from Initial Public Offerings in Japan 
170 William V. Rapp, Retail Banking: Sanwa Bank 
169 William V. Rapp, Life Insurance: Meiji Life, K.K. 
168 Robert Dekle & Koichi Yamada, On the Development 
of Rotating Credit Associations in Japan 
167 Kazuo Sato, Japan at a Crossroads 
166 Kazuo Sato, Japanese-Style Capitalism 
165 David Weinstein and Robert Lawrence, Trade and 
 Growth: Import-Led or Export-Led? Evidence from 
 Japan and Korea 
164 David Weinstein, Historical, Structural, and 
Macroeconomic Perspectives on the Japanese Economic 
Crisis 
163 Hiroshi Amari, Pharmaceuticals: Takeda 
162 Christos Cabolis, Semiconductors: NEC  
 
1998 
161 Hiroshi Amari, Pharmaceuticals: Merck 
160 William V. Rapp, Gaining and Sustaining Long-Term 
   Advantage Through Information Technology: The         
Emergence of Controlled Production 
159 Mark Tilton, Antitrust Policy and Japan’s International 
Steel Trade 
158 Takao Kato, Participatory Employment Practices in 
Japan: Past, Present and Future  
157 Ulrike Schaede, Self-Regulation and the Sanctuary 
Strategy: Competitive Advantage through Domestic 
Cooperation by Japanese Firms 
156 Mariko Sakakibara, Knowledge Sharing in 
Cooperative Research and Development 
155 Shigeru Asaba and Marvin Lieberman, Why Do Firms 
Behave Similarly? A Study on New Product Introduction 
in the Japanese Soft-Drink Industry 
154 Hiroshi Ishida, Kuo-Hsien Su and Seymour 
Spilerman, Models of Career Progression in Japanese 
and U.S. Organizations 
153 Hugh Patrick, Japan’s Economic Misery: What Next? 
152 David Flath, Japanese Technology Policy 
151 David Flath, A Perspective on Japanese Trade Policy 
and Japan-US Trade Friction 
150 David Flath, Japan’s Labor Unions 
149 David Flath & Tatsuhiko Nariu, Demand Uncertainty 
and Price Maintenance 
148 Frederic S. Mishkin, Promoting Japanese Recovery 
147 Hugh Patrick, Why I Expect Japan to Prevail: 
Ruminations on Morishima 
146 Hugh Patrick, The Causes of Japan’s Financial Crisis 
145 Ryoichi Mikitani and Patricia Hagan Kuwayama, 
Japan’s New Central Banking Law: A Critical View 
144 Koichi Hamada, The Japanese Big Bang as a Unilateral 
Action 
143 Ellie Okada, Financial Control through Japan’s Main 
Bank System and the Japanese Accounting System 
142 Edward J. Lincoln, Japan’s Economic Mess 
141 Hugh Patrick, The Development of Studies of the 
Japanese Economy in the United States: A Personal 
Odyssey 
1997 
140 Shigeyuki Goto, Study on the Interactive Approach 
between Insurance and Capital Markets for Catastrophe 
Risks 
139 Patricia Hagan Kuwayama, Postal Banking in the 
United States and Japan: A Comparative Analysis 
138 Christina L. Ahmadjian, Network Affiliation and 
Supplier Performance in the Japanese Automotive 
Industry 
137 Christina L. Ahmadjian & James R. Lincoln, 
Changing Firm Boundaries in Japanese Auto Parts 
Supply Networks 
136 Fumio Hayashi, The Main Banking System and 
Corporate Investment: An Empirical Reassessment 
135 Yasushi Hamao & Takeo Hoshi, Bank Underwriting of 
Corporate Bonds: Evidence from Japan after 1994 
134 Klaus Wallner, Implicit Contracts between Regulator 
and Firms: The Case of Japanese Casualty Insurance 
133 Klaus Wallner, Commodity Bundling in Japanese 
Non-Life Insurance: Savings-Type Products as 
Self-Selection Mechanism 
132 Patricia Hagan Kuwayama, Credit Channels and the 
Small Firm Sector in Japan 
131 Terry A. Marsh & Jean-Michel Paul, BIS Capital 
Regulations and Japanese Bank’s Bad Loan Problems 
130 Yoshinobu Shiota, Update on Japanese Bad Debt 
Restructuring 
129 Christina L. Ahmadjian, Japanese Auto Parts Supply 
Networks and the Governance of Interfirm Exchange 
128 Takatoshi Ito, Richard K. Lyons & Michael T. 
Melvin, Is There Private Information in the FX Market?  
The Tokyo Experiment 
 
1996 
127 Yukiko Ohara, Japan’s Banking: The Darkest Hour 
Before Dawn.  The Future is in the Hands of MoF 
126 Yasushi Hamao & Narasimhan Jegadeesh, An 
Analysis of Bidding in the Japanese Government Bond 
Auctions 
125 Terry A. Marsh & Jean-Michel Paul, Japanese Banks' 
Bad Loans: What Happened? 
124 Hirotaka Yamauchi & Takatoshi Ito, Air Transport 
Policy in Japan 
123 Shinji Takagi, The Japanese System of Foreign 
Exchange and Trade Control, 1950-1964 
122 David E. Weinstein, Foreign Direct Investment and 
Keiretsu: Rethinking US and Japanese Policy 
121 Masatsugu Tsuji, Deregulation and Privatization of the 
Fiscal Investment and Loan Program 
120 Koichi Hamada, Consumers, the Legal System and 
Product Liability Reform: A Comparative Perspective 
between Japan and the United States 
119 David Flath, Japanese Regulation of Truck Transport 
118 C.R. McKenzie, The Commercial Paper Market in Japan 
117 Hideo Taki, The Gas Industry in Japan 
116 Merit E. Janow, Policy Approaches to Economic 
Deregulation and Regulatory Reform 
115 Arthur J. Alexander, Domestic Aviation in Japan: 
Responding to Market Forces Amid Regulatory 
Constraints 
114 D. Eleanor Westney, The Japanese Business System: 
Key Features and Prospects for Change 
113 Robert Dekle, Endaka and Japanese Employment 
Adjustment 
112 G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Why do Markets 
Move Together? An Investigation of U.S.-Japan Stock 
Return Comovements 
111 Jun-Koo Kang & René M. Stulz, Why is There a Home 
Bias? An Analysis of Foreign Portfolio Equity 
Ownership in Japan 
110 Takeo Hoshi, Bank Organization and Screening 
Performance 
109 John W. Cooney, Jr., Kiyoshi Kato & James S. 
Schallheim, Public Placements of Seasoned Equity 
Issues in Japan 
108 Jun Cai, K.C. Chan & Takeshi Yamada, The 
Performance of Japanese Mutual Funds 
107 Jun-Koo Kang & Takeshi Yamada, The Japanese 
Market for Corporate Control and Managerial Incentives 
106 Ravi Jagannathan, Keiichi Kubota & Hitoshi 
Takehara, The CAPM with Human Capital: Evidence 
from Japan 
105 Schon Beechler, Michelle Najjar  Kristen Stucker & 
Allan Bird, Japanese-style versus American-style 
Human Resource Management Overseas: Examining 
Whether the Data Support  the “Facts” 
104 Schon Beechler, Scott Shane & Sully Taylor, Ware 
Ware Nihonjin But We’re Not All Alike: How Japanese 
Managers Champion Innovation 
103 Schon Beechler & Michelle Krazmien, The 
Relationship Between Expatriates, Parent 
Company-Affiliate Integration and HRM Control in 
Overseas Affiliates of Japanese and American MNCs 
102 Schon Beechler, Michelle Najjar, B.C. Ghosh, 
Sukiswo Dirdjosuparto & Sieh Mei Ling, Influences 
on Affiliate HRM Systems in Japanese MNCs in 
Southeast Asia 
101 Schon Beechler, John Stephan, Vladimir Pucik & 
Nigel Campbell, Decision Making Localization and 
Decentralization in Japanese MNCs: Are There Costs of 
Leaving Local Managers Out of the Loop? 
 
1995 
100 Yasushi Hamao, Living with the "Enemy": An Analysis 
of Foreign Investment in the Japanese Equity Market 
99 Yasushi Hamao, Japanese Government Bond Auctions: 
The U.S. Experience 
98 Hugh Patrick, Crumbling or Transforming?  Japan's 
Economic Success and its Postwar Economic Institutions 
97 Peter Drysdale, The Question of Access to Japanese 
Market 
96 Hugh Patrick, Northeast Asia: The Role of International 
and Regional Economic Institutions and Regimes 
95 Kazuo Sato, Bubbles in Japan's Stock Market: A 
Macroeconomic Analysis 
94 William V. Rapp, Software Policies and Hardware 
Competition: The Impact of Government, Industry and 
Users on the Development of Japan's Software Industry 
93 David Flath, The Keiretsu Puzzle 
92 Seymour Spilerman, Hiroshi Ishida & Kuo-Hsien Su, 
Educational Credentials and Promotion Prospects in a 
Japanese and an American Organization 
1994-1991 
91 Seymour Silerman, Hiroshi Ishida, Stratification and 
Attainment in a Large Japanese Firm 
90 Yasushi Hamao & Joel Hasbruck, Securities Trading 
In the Absence of Dealers  
89 Fumio Hayashi, Japan's Saving Rate: An Update 
88 Frank Packer, The Disposal of Bad Loans in Japan: A 
Review of Recent Policy Initiatives 
87 Anthony Iaquinto, Can Winners be Losers? The Case of 
the Deming Prize for Quality and Performance among 
Large Japanese Manufacturing Firms 
86 C. Tait Ratcliffe, Medium-Term Prospects for the 
Japanese Economy and for U.S.-Japan Relations 
85 Mark Scher & Schon Beechler, Japanese Banking in 
the U.S.-From Transient Advantage to Strategic Failure 
84 Schon Beechler, Scott Shane & Sully Taylor, 
Organizational Variation in Championship Behavior: 
The Case of Japanese Firms 
83 Schon Beechler & Tony Iaquinto, A Longitudinal 
Study of Staffing Patterns in U.S. Affiliates of Japanese 
Multinational Corporations 
82 Takatoshi Ito, Short-run and Long-run Expectations of 
Dollar/Yen Exchange Rate 
81 Edward Lincoln, Fundamental Issues in the United 
States-Japan Economic Relationship 
80 Fumio Hayashi, Is the Japanese Extended Family 
Altruistically Linked? 
79 Schon Beechler & Sheri Ranis, The Prospects for 
Industrial Cooperation Between the United States and 
Japan 
78    Marcus Noland, US – Japan Trade Friction 
77 Frank Packer, The Role of Long-Term Credit Banks 
        Within the Main Bank System 
76 John Campbell & Yasushi Hamao, Changing Patterns   
        in Corporate Financing and the Main Bank System in    
        Japan 
75 Hugh Patrick, The Relevance of Japanese Finance and 
         its Main Bank System 
74 Michael Smitka, Contracting Without Contracts: How  
        the Japanese Manage Organizational Transactions 
73 Takatoshi Ito & Keiko Nosse Hirono, The Efficiency  
       of the Tokyo Housing Market 
72 David Flath & Tatsuhiko Mariu, Is Japan’s Retail 
        Sector Truly Distinctive? 
71 Linda Edwards, The Status of Women in Japan: Has the 
Equal Opportunity Law Made a Difference? 
70 David Flath, Keiretsu Shareholding Ties: Antitrust 
Issues 
69 Yasushi Hamao & Joel Hasbrouck, Securities Trading 
in the Absence of Dealers: Trades and Quotes on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 
68 Schon Beechler & Allan Bird, The Transfer of Human  
        Resource Management Overseas: An Exploratory Study 
        of Japanese and American Maquiladoras 
67 Charles Hall, Yasushi Hamao, & Trevor Harris,  
A Comparison of Relations Between Security Market 
Prices, Returns and Accounting Measure s in Japan and 
the US. 
66 Schon Beechler & Allan Bird, The Best of Both 
Worlds?  An Exploratory Study of Human Resource 
Management Practices in US Based Japanese Affiliates 
65 Michael Smitka, The Decline of the Japanese 
Automobile Industry: Domestic and International 
Implications 
64 Hugh Patrick, Comparisons, Contrasts, and 
Implications from the Financial Development of Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan 
63 Theodore C. Bestor, Visible Hands: Auctions and 
Institutional Integration in the Tsukiji Wholesale Fish 
Market, Tokyo 
62 Frank Packer & Marc Ryser, The Governance of 
Failure: An Anatomy of Corporate Bankruptcy in Japan 
61 William Rapp, Japanese Multinationals: An 
Evolutionary Theory and Some Potential Global Political 
Implications for the 1990’s 
60 David Flath & Tatsuhiko Nariu, The Complexity of 
Wholesale Distribution Channels in Japan 
59 David Flath, Indirect Shareholding Within Japan’s 
Business Groups 
58 Tatsuo Hatta & Toru Ohkawara, Commuting and 
Land Prices in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area. 
57 John Campbell & Yasushi Hamao, Predictable Stock 
Returns in the United States and Japan: A Study of 
Long-Term Intergration 
56 Hugh Patrick, Peace and Security on the Korean 
Peninsula: Reflections on the Economic Dimension 
55 Yasushi Hamao & Ronald Masulis, The Effect of the 
1987 Stock Crash on International Financial Integration  
54 Anthony L. Iaquinto, Japanese Investment in the Border 
Region of the United States and Mexico 
53 John Campbell & Yasushi Hamao, Monetary Policy 
and the Term Structure of Interest Rates in Japan 
52 Robert Dekle, Alternative Estimates of Japanese Saving 
and Comparisons with the US 
51 Ellen R. Auster, Penetration Without Dependence: A 
Network Analysis of Japanese Economic Activity in the 
U.S. 
50 Hugh Patrick, Japan's Financial System and the 
Evolving Role of Main Banks 
49 Anthony L. Iaquinto & Schon L. Beechler, The 
Performance Implications of Asset versus Transactional 
Advantages of MNEs 
 
             1990 
48 Ross Garnaut, The Market and the State in Economic 
Development: Some Questions from East Asia and 
Australia  
47 Kazuo Sato, Japan’s Resource Imports 
46 Hugh Patrick, Section 301 and the U.S. Japan Economic 
Relationship: Reflections on Kuroda 
45 Louis K.C. Chan, Yasushi Hamao & Josef 
Lakonishok, Fundamentals and Stock Returns in Japan 
44 Peter Drysdale, Change and Response in Japan’s 
International Economic Policy 
43 David Flath, Shareholding Interlocks in the Keiretsu, 
Japan’s Financial Groups 
42 Edward J. Lincoln, The Controversy Over Japan’s Low 
Manufactured Imports 
41 Edward J. Lincoln, Japan’s Role in Asia Pacific 
Cooperation: Dimension, prospects, and Problems 
40 Ellen R. Auster, Bringing a Network Perspective into 
Research on Technological Transfers and Other 
Interorganizational Relationships  
 
             1989 
39 Hong W. Tan & Atsushi Seike, Pensions and Labor 
Turnover in Japan 
38 Maurice J. Wilkinson, Inventory Behavior and 
Economic Instability in Japan 
37 Michael J. Smitka, American Management: Reform or 
Revolution? The Transfer of Japanese Management 
Technology to the U.S. 
36  Koichi Hamada, The Causes and Consequences of 
Japan’s High Savings Ratio 
35 Ellen R. Auster, The Relationship of Industry Evolution 
to Patterns of Technology Linkages, Joint Ventures, and 
Direct Investment Between the U.S. and Japan 
34 Masako N. Darrough & Trevor S. Harris, Do 
Management Forecasts of Earnings Affect Stock Prices 
in Japan?  
33 Phillip A. Klein & Geoffrey H. Moore, Analyzing 
Leading and Coincident Indicators for Pacific Basin 
Countries 
32 Geoffrey H. Moore & John P. Cullity, Growth Cycle 
Signals as Inflation Indicators for Major Industrial 
Nations 
31 Takatoshi Ito, Foreign Exchange Rate Expectations: 
Micro Survey Data 
30  Takatoshi Ito, Is the Bank of Japan a Closet Monetarist?  
29 David Flath, The Economic Rationality of the Japanese 
Distribution System 
28 Hugh Patrick, Declining Industries, Mechanism of 
Structural Adjustment and Trade Policy in Pacific Basin 
Economics 
27 Susuma Fukuda, The Fiscal Investment and Loan 
System 
26 Shoichi Saba, The Japanese Cooperation and its 
Management  
25 Peter Drysdale & Ross Garnaut, A Pacific Free Trade 
Area? 
24 James Moore Jr., The United States and Japan: 
Competition and Cooperation 
 
1988 
23 Akio Mikuni, Japan’s Financial Power] 
22 Ariyoshi Okumura, The Future Role of Tokyo’s 
Financial Market 
21 Robert Dekle, The Relationship Between Defense 
Spending and Economic Performance in Japan 
20 Hugh Patrick, Explaining the Japanese Financial 
System: A Review of the Bank of Japan’s Recent Volume 
19 Mototada Kikkawa, Problems of the U.S. Trade 
Structure 
18 Hugh Patrick & Frances Rosenbluth, Japan’s 
Industrial Structure in Crisis: National Concerns and 
International Implications 
17 David Flath, Why are There So Many Retail Stores in 
Japan? 
16 Richard Baldwin, Some Empirical Evidence on 
Hysteresis in Aggregate U.S. Import Prices  
15 Frances Rosenbluth, The Political Economy of 
Internationalizing the Japanese Financial System: The 
Case of the Bond Market 
14 Robert Dekle, Do the Japanese Elderly Reduce Their 
Total Wealth? 
 
          1987 
13 Yoshio Higuchi, A Comparative Study of Japanese 
Plants Operating in the U.S. and American Plants: 
Recruitment, Job Training, Wage Structure and Job 
Separation 
12 Jacob Mineer & Yoshio Higuchi, Wage Structures and 
Labor Turnover in the U.S. and in Japan 
11 Fumio Hayashi & Takatoshi Ito, Housing Finance 
Imperfections and Private Saving: A Comparative 
Simulation Analysis of the United States and Japan 
10 Hugh Patrick, The Management of the United 
States-Japan Trade Relationship and its Implications for 
the Pacific Basin 
9 Michael Smitka, Japanese Labor Market and 
Subcontracting  
8 Takatoshi Ito, The Intra-Daily Exchange Rate 
Dynamics and Monetary Policies after the G5 Agreement 
7 Yoshio Higuchi, Labor Force Withdrawal, Re-entry and 
Wages by Educational Attainment in Japanese Women 
6 Kazuo Sato, Savings and Investment in Japan 
5  Koichi Hamada & Hugh Patrick, Japan and the 
International Monetary Regime 
 
                
1986 
4 Kazuo Sato, Econometric Models of the Japanese 
Economy 
3 Hugh Patrick & Thomas Rohlen, Japan’s Small-Scale 
Family Enterprises  
2 Richard Baldwin & Paul Krugman, Market Access 
and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 
16K Random Access Memories 
1 Hugh Patrick, Japanese High Technology Industrial 





56 Shigeyuki Goto, A Behavioral Risk Management     
 System 
   
2003 
55 Shigeyuki Goto & Hiroshi Hayakawa, Building the 
corporate risk control system with some viewpoints on 
the risk psychology 
54 Ryozo Hayashi, Economic Reform: View from  
METI 
 
53 Junji Narita, The Economic Consequences of the 
‘Price Keeping Operation’ in the Japanese Stock 
Markets 
52 Shigeyuki Goto, Non-Life Insurance, E-Commerce, 
and the Importance of Proper Risk Communication 
51 Hugh Patrick, Japan’s Mediocre Economic 
Performance Persists and Fundamental Problems 
 Remain Unresolved 
50 Takao Sase, The Irresponsible Japanese Top 
Management Under the Cross-Shareholding 
Arrangement 
 
      
      2002   
49 Naotaka Kawakami, The Impact of the Post Cold War 
Crises on the Political Economy of Japan 
48 Yasuhisa Shiozaki, Can Japan’s Ailing Banking 
System Be Cured? 
 
      2001 
47 Shigeyuki Goto, E-Commerce in the Japanese 
Non-Life Insurance Market 
46 Yasushi Ueno, Effectiveness and Importance of 
Leadership in the Changing Period 
      
2000 




44 Shunji Fukukawa, Japan’s Challenge for Economic 
        Revitalization 
43 Patricia Hagan Kuwayama, Lessons from Bad 




42 Junichi Ujiie, Investment Banking in Japan 
41 Toyoo Gyohten, The Japanese Financial System: 
Restructuring for the Future 
40 William E. Franklin, Careers in International/Asia 
Pacific Business:  Perspectives of an Experienced 
Japan Hand 
39 Jay W. Chai, Wounded Asia vs. the IMF: Where do 
we go from here? 
38 Lawrence H. Summers, The US-Japanese Stake in a 
Free and Open Asian Capital Market 
37 Yuichiro Nagatomi, The Challenges Before 
Industrialized Countries 




35 Yuji Suzuki, Strategy Towards the “Big Bang” The 
Industrial Bank of Japan’s Approach 
34 Maryann Keller, International Automobile 




33 Hugh Patrick, How the Japanese Financial System 
and Its Main Bank System Have Dealt with Generic 
Issues of Financial Banking 
32 Patricia Hagan Kuwayama, Comments on Japanese 
Economic Policy 
31 Roger M. Kubarych, The Yen and the Dollar: 
Irrational Exuberance? 
30 Robert Pitofsky, Competition Policy in 
Communications Industries: New Antitrust 
Approaches 
29 Masaya Miyoshi, Japan’s Capitalism in Systemic 
Transformation 
28 Yasuo Kanzaki, Japan’s “Super” Big Bang: 
Hashimoto’s Make-or-Break Gamble 
 
1996 
27 Sheldon Weinig, Can an American Entrepreneur Work 
for a Japanese Company and Be Effective and Happy? 
26 Takeshi Nagano, The History and Future of Japanese 
Management 
25 Isao Matsuura, Japanese Banks in Transition: 
Problems and Prospects 
24 Max C. Chapman, Jr., A Viable Strategy for Japanese 
Securities Firms in the United States 
        10 Nobuo Ohashi, Innovation and Technical 
Development in the Japanese Steel Industry 1995-1991 
23 Yotaro Kobayashi, The Japanese Corporation in 
Transition: Current Challenges and Outlook 
22 Hideo Ishihara, Re-evaluating the Japanese Corporate 
System 
21 Yoshitaka Fujitani, Challenges Facing Japanese Steel 
in Today's Global Economy 
20 Kenichi Ohmae, Japanese Corporate Strategy in Crisis 
19 Shijuro Ogata, The Japanese Economy and the 
Aftermath of Its Unusual Recession 
18 Jeffrey Garten, U.S.-Japan Relations: 
Accomplishments, Next Steps, Future Considerations 
16 Susumu Yoshida, Agenda for Japanese Business in the 
Global Economy 
15 Saburo Okita, Japan's Role in a Changing World 
Economy 
14 Takeo Siina, Selling IBM in Japan, Selling Japan in 
IBM 
13 Hugh Patrick, Some Thoughts on Japan's Financial 
Mess 
12 Yoshitoki Chino, A Monologue on Japan's Financial 
Market 
11 Jeffrey Garten, Thinking About World Order: 
America, Japan and Germany in the 1990's 
9 Yuzaburo Mogi, Problems and Solutions to Japanese 
Investment Abroad 
8 Hugh Patrick, One World, Two Worlds or Three? 
Reflections on the New International Economic Order 
7 Kensuke Hotta, Deregulation of the Japanese 
Financial Markets and the Role of Japanese Banks 
6 Hironobu Shibuya, Taking Responsibility: Japanese 
Companies and Corporate Citizenship 
5 Sam Kusumoto, Going Global Without Going Broke 
 
    1990-1989 
4 Yuchichiro Nagatomi, The Financial System and 
Global Socioeconomic Change  
3 Yoshio Terasawa, The M.I.G.A. and its Mission 
2 Eiji Umene, The United States-Japan Relationship in 
the Rapidly Changing World Environment 
1 Nobutoshi Akao & Joseph A. Massey, Agenda for a 
Pacific Partnership: A Japanese-American Dialogue 
 
CENTER ON JAPANESE ECONOMY AND BUSINESS 
Working and Occasional Papers 
Order Form 
 
All of our Working & Occasional Papers are now available for you to download for free from 
http://digitalcommons.libraries.columbia.edu/japan/.  
 
To order hard copies of working paper(s) and/or occasional paper(s), please fill out this form and return it to the 
address below with a check made payable to the Columbia University.  Papers are $5 each. 
 
 
 Center on Japanese Economy and Business 
 Attn.: Jeff Lagomarsino 
    Columbia Business School 
    321 Uris Hall 
    3022 Broadway 
 New York, NY 10027 
 
 
Title of paper(s) ordered:    (Paper #)     No. of copies 
 
................................................................................. (#          )  x                    
 
................................................................................. (#          )  x                    
 
Total Cost:       $5  x                  = $              
 
 
Please provide the address to which the paper(s) should be mailed (please print): 
 
 
 Name: .......................................................................................... 
 
 Affiliation: .......................................................................................... 
 
 Address: .......................................................................................... 
 
  .......................................................................................... 
 
  .......................................................................................... 
 
 Tel: .......................................................................................... 
 
                Fax: .......................................................................................... 
 
 
